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I. ON THE EU AS A “MIXED JURISDICTION” 
 The nature of mixed jurisdictions has been widely researched in the 
recent past.  For many years, the expression “mixed jurisdictions” was 
traditionally understood to refer to those hybrid legal systems which 
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combined elements of both civil law and common law;1 the expression 
was sometimes also used to describe only the territory in which a mixed 
jurisdiction existed, rather than the mixed jurisdiction itself.2  The list of 
countries that the expression traditionally referred to (Quebec, South 
Africa, Louisiana, Scotland, Israel, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, the Seychelles, 
Saint Lucia and Zimbabwe)3 in some cases was expanded, under a more 
inclusive theory based on the concept of legal pluralism, to include Iran, 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Indonesia, and in this case the expression “mixed 
legal system” was sometimes used instead of “mixed jurisdiction”;4 
eventually the list also came to include Australia, the Basque Country, 
Algeria, Hong Kong and the European Union.5 
 The features a “legal system”, or “jurisdiction”, has to display in 
order to be recognized as “mixed” traditionally were:  (1) that the law in 
question was specifically a civil-/common-law mixture, (2) that this 
mixture reached sufficient proportions to strike a neutral observer as 
obvious, and (3) that private civil law and public Anglo-American 
(common) law were completely separate.6  According to a partially 
different definition, “mixed jurisdictions” or “mixed legal systems” are 
systems in which elements from more than one traditional legal formant 
co-exist or intermingle:  “Mixed legal systems come into being as a 
result of the transmigration of legal ideas, institutions, concepts and 
structures under various types of pressure, internal or external”.7  The 
former definition perhaps better captures the key features of a possible 
definition, while the latter definition seems more precise in attempting to 
describe the flow dynamics of legal rules and principles, and the idea of 
                                                 
 1. Thomas B. Smith, The Preservation of the Civilian Tradition in ‘Mixed Jurisdictions’, 
in CIVIL LAW IN THE MODERN WORLD 1, 2-3 (A.N. Yiannopoulos ed., La. State Univ. Press 1965). 
 2. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions:  Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 685 (2000), available at http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/ 
vol60/iss3/2. 
 3. For the historical development of the theories of mixed systems, see Vernon V. 
Palmer, Two Rival Theories of Mixed Legal Systems Electronic, in 12.1 ELEC. J. COMP. L. 7 ff. 
(May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-16.pdf. 
 4. Tetley, supra note 2, at 680 n.2. 
 5. STUDIES IN LEGAL SYSTEMS:  MIXED AND MIXING (Esin Orücü et al. eds., Kluwer Law 
Int’l, The Hague, 1996). 
 6. MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:  THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 19 ff. (Vernon V. 
Palmer ed., 2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press:  Cambridge 2012). 
 7. Esin Orücü, Public Law in Mixed Legal Systems and Public Law as a “Mixed 
System”, in 5.2 ELEC. J. COMP. L. (May 2001), http://www.ejcl.org/52/art52-2.html; of the same 
author, see also What Is a Mixed Legal System:  Exclusion or Expansion?, in 12.1 ELEC. J. COMP. 
L. (May 2008), http://www.ejcl.org/121/art121-15.pdf [hereinafter Orücü, What Is a Mixed Legal 
System]. 
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“cross-fertilisation”8 that developed from the original theory of legal 
transplants.  In any case, despite conceptual uncertainty and lack of a 
shared definition, a number of commentators have suggested that the 
European supranational legal order9 is a “mixed jurisdiction” or a “mixed 
legal system”.  We believe the European legal system is an “evolving 
mix” and that through study of the nature of this mix10 we can gain further 
insight into the interaction between law and culture, given that many mixed 
jurisdictions or mixed legal systems came into existence as a result of a 
culture’s wish to preserve its language, religion, historical experience, 
and not least, law and customs.11 
 Europe is a supranational legal space which straddles both a 
codified system and an uncodified one.  Both formal and informal rules 
make up the complex architecture of EU law:  binding rules contained in 
the Treaties and in legislative acts, but also in informal sources, such as 
business practices and customs; persuasive rules contained in soft law 
instruments such as notices, guidelines, resolutions, proposals and 
preparatory documents, such as white papers, recommendations and 
green papers expressed in the form of Communications from the 
Commission in many different areas of law; finally, general principles 
that find application through leading cases heard by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU). 
 Moreover, the acquis communautaire,12 the constantly evolving 
body of European Union law, is expressed in twenty-four official 
                                                 
 8.  
Transplants involve the transposition of a doctrine from one legal system into 
another. . . .  Cross-fertilisation implies a different, more indirect process.  It implies 
that an external stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system.  The 
evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in its own way.  
The new development is a distinctive but organic product of that system rather than a 
bolt-on.  This process often gives rise to greater convergence between the receiving 
legal system and the external stimulus, but this need not to be the case. 
John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in JACK BEATSON 
& TAKIS TRIDIMAS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 147-65, at 147 (Hart Publ’g:  
Oxford 1998). 
 9. JAN SMITS, THE MAKING OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW:  TOWARD A IUS COMMUNE 
EUROPAEUM AS A MIXED LEGAL SYSTEM (Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002); Francesca Fiorentini, 
Tertium datur. Le giurisdizioni “miste” fra common law e civil law, in RIVISTA CRITICA DI DIRITTO 
PRIVATO 449-59 (2002); Hein Kötz, The Value of Mixed Jurisdictions, 78 TUL. L. REV. 435, 439 
(2003).  Noreen Burrows proposed another expression to identify the peculiarity of the European 
law:  the “mega mix”; see her article European Community:  The Mega Mix, in Orücü, supra note 
5, at 297-312. 
 10. Orücü, What Is a Mixed Legal System, supra note 7, at 16. 
 11. MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:  THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY, supra note 6, at 24. 
 12. It consists of principles, political objectives and provisions of the Treaties; of 
secondary legislation (Regulations, Directives, Decisions, Recommendations and Opinions) 
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languages.  The European legal system is thus a supranational 
multilingual legal space,13 a fact that adds even further complexity to it.  
It shares some characteristics of civil law tradition and others of common 
law, and has some unusual characteristics:  among others, judicial 
activity is not carried out by a single hierarchy of judicial officers, and 
the CJEU is not a trial court.  Hence it is impossible to guarantee 
homogeneous interpretation and application of the law.  In fact, 
implementation of European legal rules is left to Member States’ courts:  
rules are interpreted in different ways by national courts, and then, if 
necessary, reviewed by the CJEU. 
 This is the most original aspect of Europe’s blend:  there is no 
equivalent in national legal orders.14  More specifically, the preliminary 
                                                                                                                  
adopted in applying the Treaties; of the judicial precedents of the CJEU, which has traditionally 
occupied an important place as a source of law; of the declarations and resolutions adopted within 
the framework of the Union; of acts which are part of foreign policy and common security; of 
acts which are part of justice and home affairs; of international agreements made by the 
Community and of agreements made by Member States with one another in the sectors of 
competence which are conferred upon the Union in the Treaties (principle of conferral:  see Arts. 
3 and 5 Treaty of European Union, hereinafter TEU). 
 13. On law and legal translation, see the seminal work of SUSAN ŠARČEVIĆ, NEW 
APPROACH TO LEGAL TRANSLATION (The Hague:  Kluwer Law Int’l 2000).  On multilingualism 
and European law, among others, see LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY (Anne 
Lise Kjær & Silvia Adamo eds., Surrey:  Ashgate 2011); LANGUAGE AND THE LAW:  
INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOKS (Krzysztof Kredens & Stanisław Goźdź-Roszkowski eds., Frankfurt 
am Main:  Peter Lang 2007); MULTILINGUALISM AND THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN LAW 
(Barbara Pozzo & Valentina Jacometti eds., Zuidpoolsingel:  Kluwer Law Int’l 2006); UNIFORM 
TERMINOLOGY FOR EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Gianmaria Ajani & Martin Ebers eds., Baden-
Baden:  Nomos 2005).  On the main problem in EU translation, which is at the conceptual level, 
not at the level of the term, see S. Šarčević, Coping with the Challenges of Legal Translation in 
Harmonization, in THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRANSLATION IN LEGAL HARMONIZATION 96 ff. (Cornelis 
J.W. Baaij ed., Alphen aan den Rijn:  Kluwer Law Int’l 2012); cf. also Barbara Pasa, Old Terms 
for New Concepts in Consumer Contracts?, in 09/07 JEAN MONNET WORKING PAPERS NYU 
SCHOOL OF LAW 1-31 (2007), http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/07/070901.html. 
 14.  
This court structure is different from national systems of administration of justice.  
These are characterised by compartmentalisation and decentralisation.  There are 
specialised courts for particular areas, such as tax, intellectual property law, labour law 
and social security, and distinctions may be made between private law courts and 
administrative ones.  Multi-tiered systems of appeal result in only a very small 
proportion of cases reaching the more senior courts.  The preliminary reference 
procedure, by contrast, allows all courts and tribunals within the European Union, no 
matter how high or low, to make a reference to a single court:  the Court of Justice.  
The Community court structure is, therefore, a flat court structure of ‘first, and then 
equals’, in which all national courts are granted equal possibilities to make a reference 
to the Court of Justice, and no national law can disenfranchise any national court of the 
possibility of making reference. 
DAMIAN CHALMERS & ADAM TOMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC LAW 291-92 (Cambridge Univ. 
Press:  Cambridge 2007). 
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ruling is the key tool enabling communication and cooperation between 
the CJEU and the national courts.15  The function of this procedure is well 
known:  in cases involving EU law, national courts, if in doubt as to the 
interpretation or validity of the law, may, and in some cases must, seek a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the relevant issue (Art. 267 Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)). 
 During the last few decades, this procedure has progressively 
acquired a fundamental role in shaping the European legal system; 
currently, it appears that key cases of judicial creativity (both European 
and national) primarily result from the flexible nature of preliminary 
rulings, which “preserve the integrity and coherence of the Community 
legal order in an era of constitutional pluralism and diversity.”16 
 The preliminary ruling constitutes a double-faced tool for the 
national courts.  Through it, the CJEU rules on interpretation and 
application of European law and answers questions formulated by 
national courts; but, at the same time, the CJEU leaves the last word on 
the compatibility of national rules with European law to national judges.17  
Thus, the cooperative system typical of preliminary reference allows 
national courts to reconcile the CJEU’s jurisprudence with the particular 
features of national laws and the facts of the case before them.18  As a 
consequence (and most interestingly in our view), judicial creativity 
                                                 
 15. HENRICUS G. SCHERMERS & DENNIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 228 (Kluwer Law Int’l:  The Hague-London-New York 2001).  As is well 
known, the preliminary ruling is the main or rather the only means of communication and 
cooperation between the CJEU and the national courts.  The preliminary ruling procedure enables 
national courts to question the Court of Justice on the interpretation or validity of European law.  
Accordingly, the incidental nature of the preliminary ruling, which can be promoted in the context 
of a conflict between private parties or a private party and public authorities, makes the national 
courts’ initiative crucial, not only with regard to frequency of rulings, but also to technique and 
skill in consulting the CJEU. 
 16. Takis Tridimas, Knocking on Heaven’s Door:  Fragmentation, Efficiency and 
Defiance in the Preliminary Reference Procedure, in 40 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 9-50, at 46 
(2003). 
 17. For example, the CJEU, referring to state liability for judicial breach of European law, 
stated: 
In order to determine whether the infringement is sufficiently serious when the 
infringement at issue stems from such a decision, the competent national court, taking 
into account the specific nature of the judicial function, must determine whether that 
infringement is manifest.  It is for the legal system of each Member State to designate 
the court competent to determine disputes relating to that reparation. 
Gerhard Köbler v. Republik Österreich, Case C-224/01, [2003] ECR I-10239, para. 59. 
 18. Koen Lenaerts & Tim Corthaut, Toward an Internally Consistent Doctrine on 
Invoking Norms of EU Law, in SACHA PRECHAL & BERT VAN ROERMUND, THE COHERENCE OF EU 
LAW:  THE SEARCH FOR UNITY IN DIVERGENT CONCEPTS 495-515, at 501 (Oxford Univ. Press:  
Oxford 2008). 
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develops on many different levels, the supranational level of the CJEU, 
and the national levels of the twenty-eight judiciaries of the Member 
States, governed by different rules of procedure, structured according to 
different models of constitutional review (“diffuse” or “concentrated” in 
a specialised tribunal), and with courts presided over by professional 
judges (dealing with civil and criminal law, and administrative law) and 
non-professional judges (lay persons serving as judges in areas where 
they have expertise, such as commercial law, or providing an element of 
popular participation and balancing formal legal rationality to guarantee 
standards of fairness).19 
 This complex interaction provides a basis for cultural exchange, 
enhancing reciprocal influence both from national judges on European 
institutions and from the CJEU on national case law and national legal 
orders in general.20  As we will see below, national judicial creativity has 
reached a level that takes it beyond being a simple consequence of 
national autonomy.  Indeed, the mechanism of cross-fertilisation consists 
in a much deeper and more pervasive dynamic of mutual imitation, 
which goes considerably further than the point which a formal balance 
between principles would suggest. 
II. A TAXONOMY OF GAPS IN EUROPEAN LAW COMBINED WITH A 
POSSIBLE TAXONOMY OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 In this Part, we will describe how the European Union as “mixed 
jurisdiction” or a “mixed legal system” can evolve remarkably quickly 
and cover various areas of law outside areas of conferred competence, 
especially because of the creative function of the courts.21  In particular, 
the Europeanization22 of law must not to be confused with the fact that 
the CJEU has exclusive jurisdiction on certain issues.  By the term 
                                                 
 19. Each judiciary in Europe is nested with a set of relationships to a legal community, to 
institutions, and to the wider society.  Cf. JOHN BELL, JUDICIARIES WITHIN EUROPE:  A 
COMPARATIVE REVIEW (CSICL, Cambridge:  Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).  On different models 
of judicial review (top-down vs. bottom-up models, i.e., the traditional French model vs. the 
emerging “dialogue” model), see TRADITIONS AND CHANGE IN EUROPEAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
(Roberto Caranta & Anna Gerbrandy eds., Europa Law Publ’g 2011); cf. Vittoria Barsotti & 
Vincenzo Varano (a cura di), Il nuovo ruolo delle Corti supreme nell’ordine politico e 
istituzionale, in ANNUARIO DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E STUDI LEGISLATIVI (ESI Napoli 2012). 
 20. ANTONIO LAZARI, MODELLI E PARADIGMI DELLA RESPONSABILITÀ DELLO STATO 284 
(Giappichelli, Torino 2005). 
 21. Concrete examples are to be found in Parts III-VI of this Article. 
 22. Walter van Gerven, The ECJ Case-Law as a Means of Unification of Private Law?, in 
TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE ch. 6, at 101 ff. (Arthur S. Hartkamp & Ewoud Hondius et al. 
eds., 3d ed., Nijmegen:  Kluwer Law Int’l 2004); see also GIAN ANTONIO BENACCHIO & BARBARA 
PASA, A COMMON LAW FOR EUROPE (CEU Press:  Budapest 2005). 
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“Europeanization of law,” we refer to another phenomenon, by which 
national laws are aligned to EU law through the process of interpretation 
and application of legal rules carried out by judges at national level.23  
This process of interpreting and enforcing national law according to 
European rules, aims and principles applies mainly in two circumstances:  
(1) in interpretation, in compliance with EU law, of national rules which 
result mainly from implementation of a Directive (which is binding as to 
result, without dictating choice of form and methods to achieve that 
result).  In such cases, the interpreter must favour the legal argument 
which is most faithful to the text and the purpose of the Directive; he/she 
has to set aside national legal rules incompatible with EU law; (2) in 
interpretation of national rules which have no apparent functional link 
with EU law, that is, rules which are not the result of implementation of a 
Directive, and do not derive from an express or implied obligation to 
comply with European law.  This situation occurs each time a pre-
existing internal rule would be in conflict with a later European rule, that 
has not yet been implemented, if interpreted according to national 
criteria.  The internal rule would thus be incompatible with the European 
rule, still to be implemented.  In this case, the national judge has a duty 
to adapt the interpretation of the national rule, so that he/she may 
continue to apply the national rule without running the risk that the 
CJEU, which ensures the correct application of EU law, will rule against 
it.  The ruling which formulated this duty for national judges related to 
the Marleasing case (1990).24  The principle of the supremacy of EU law 
over national law is operating here, rather than a presumption of 
conformity. 
 When interpreting general principles which the CJEU reads into or 
deduces from the general structure and features of the European legal 
order, the Court’s preference for interpreting wording precisely (as in the 
case of Directives, and sometimes of Regulations) leaves space for a 
different kind of interpretation that balances conflicting interests 
                                                 
 23. Judicial style has also been changing in recent decades with the Europeanization of 
the law.  The complexity of issues arising in litigation within Europe’s mixed jurisdiction and the 
way in which litigation is conducted (mainly document-based trials), coupled with efficient 
databases, bear much of the responsibility for the ever-growing length of modern judgments, both 
at European and at national levels.  We have more expansive judgments than before, that we could 
classify as “tonsorial or agglutinative” (CHIEF JUSTICE CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE (1925), 
reprinted in 48 YALE L.J. 489, 493 (1939)), because they emerge “from the shears and the paste 
pot which are its implements and emblem” (i.e., by scissors and paste).  On the increasing length 
of judgments, cf. Lady Justice Arden D.B.E., Judgment Writing:  Are Shorter Judgments 
Achievable?, in 128 LAW Q. REV. 515 ff. (2012). 
 24. Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA, Case C-106/89, 
[1990] ECR I-4135. 
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expressed in general principles.  However, neither the European 
legislature, nor the CJEU have intervened to qualify and define a term 
which is key to this issue: “gap”.  What are legal gaps?  How does the 
CJEU recognize them?  Which criteria does the Court develop to fill 
them?  Does the Court select the most suitable hermeneutic criteria to fill 
the gaps?  Does the Court refer to a hierarchy of hermeneutic criteria in 
order to proceed in a coherent way? 
 The European legal system, in itself, does not define the notion of 
gap in its Treaties.  There are no explicit CJEU rulings addressing the 
question of how to fill gaps.  In CJEU case law we have found neither a 
definition of gap, nor the hermeneutic criteria used to fill them. 
 This is not surprising.  The CJEU is not formalistic, either in its 
manner of applying the preliminary ruling procedure, or in its judging 
techniques.  Despite the binding character of its case law, its judicial 
criteria have had to be inferred by commentators (see Part 3), and an 
official taxonomy of the rules of interpretation does not exist.  Formal 
limitation of CJEU interpretative activity is indicated by the areas of 
competence attributed by the Treaties, according to Art. 5(2) TEU.25 
 On the national side, however, we know that many civil codes 
provide a hierarchical set of rules through which the function of filling 
the gaps develops alongside legal interpretation:  see for example, Art. 12 
of Disposizioni Preliminari of the Italian Civil Code; Arts. 6 and 7 of the 
Austrian Civil Code ABGB; Art. 1 of the Swiss Civil Code; or Arts. 1 
and 4 of the Spanish Civil Code.  Those criteria apply both when there is 
a normative gap (the legal rule does not exist and it is inferred from 
general principles) and when there is a nominal gap (the legal rule exists, 
but is perceived as not appropriate or correct).  In this respect, we can 
expect that the Europeanization of national legal systems will blur the 
boundaries of the two main European models of interpretation, “passive 
interpretivism” and “theoretical activism”,26 the former with the judge as 
bouche de la loi, reflecting the myth of inclusiveness of the French Civil 
code,27 and the latter with the judge-legislator, where judges play a 
creative role in deciding cases for which codified law fails to prescribe an 
                                                 
 25. Cf. Order of the Court (Third Chamber) of 12 July 2012 (reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Tribunale ordinario di Brescia, Italy), Gennaro Currà & Others v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Case C-466/11, 12.7.2012. 
 26. On this point, see, among others, Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Methods in Comparative 
Law:  An Intellectual Overview, in METHODS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7-24, at 21 (P.G. Monateri 
ed., Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar Publ’g 2012). 
 27. Cf. Art. 4 of the Code Civil, which forces the judge to undertake a decision although 
the law is obscure (prohibition of non liquet), and Art. 5 of the same Code, which prevents the 
judge from overstepping the scope of judicial power. 
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answer28 (a model which influenced for example the Swiss Civil Code, 
Art. 1, para. 2). 
 At the international level, the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (1969), Arts. 31, 32 and 33, also provides rules for interpretation 
of treaties, taking into consideration the terms of the Treaties in their 
context and in the light of their object and purpose, and as supplementary 
means of interpretation, the preparatory work of the Treaties and the 
circumstances of their conclusion.29  But the “intermediate level” between 
national and international, that is the supranational level of European law, 
follows its own peculiar path. 
III. FILLING LEGAL GAPS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL 
 When making decisions on issues in European law, the CJEU has to 
fill the (normative) gaps left by the Treaties and legislative acts.  Thus, 
judicial creativity first appears at European level, because the CJEU fills 
the gaps left by the primary and secondary sources of European law, as 
well as those gaps left by its rulings (see infra this Part).  Secondly, the 
mixed nature of the European legal space means that gap-filling relates 
also to the multilayer system of negotiation between CJEU and national 
courts, which has been established through transformation of the 
preliminary ruling procedure (see Part III.B). 
 Although the European legal order does not recognize any system 
or procedure for filling gaps either in its Treaties or in its legislative acts, 
the CJEU (whose members are highly qualified judicial officers in their 
own countries or jurists of recognized competence) does in reality use a 
number of techniques to do this.  As some authors have noted, “activism” 
in relation to the CJEU indicates  judgments issued with no basis in the 
                                                 
 28. According to Rudolf von Jhering’s Interessenjurisprudenz and then Kantorowicz (or, 
in France, to the Gény’s libre recherche scientifique):  see Viviane Grosswald Curran, Rethinking 
Hermann Kantorowicz:  Free Law, American Legal Realism and the Legacy of Anti-Formalism, 
in RETHINKING THE MASTERS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 66-93, at 68 (Annelise Riles ed., Oxford & 
Portland/Oregon:  Hart Publ’g 2001). 
 29. As recent literature testifies, there is continuing scholarly interest in interpretation, 
sometimes at the cost of over-theorizing.  See ROBERT KOLB, INTERPRÉTATION ET CRÉATION DU 
DROIT INTERNATIONAL:  ESQUISSE D’UNE HERMÉNEUTIQUE JURIDIQUE MODERNE POUR LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (Brussels:  Bruylant, 2006); CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ DE CASADEVANTE I 
ROMANI, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS (Berlin:  Springer 2007); 
RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION (Oxford:  Oxford Univ. Press 2008); ULF 
LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES:  THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS 
EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (Dordrecht:  Springer 
2007); ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, THE INTERPRETATION OF ACTS AND RULES IN PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Oxford:  Oxford Univ. Press 2008); ISABELLE VAN DAMME, TREATY 
INTERPRETATION BY THE WTO APPELLATE BODY (Oxford:  Oxford Univ. Press 2009). 
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Treaties or in the secondary binding measures based on the Treaties.30  
These sources make no provision on many matters, and this is when the 
Court is activist or pro-active. 
 Many commentators have studied the interpretive methods used by 
the CJEU.31  It is generally agreed that there are three types of interpretive 
criteria used by the CJEU:  (1)  semiotic or linguistic arguments, 
(2) systemic and context-establishing arguments, and (3) teleological, 
functional or consequentialist arguments.32  While the first two are less 
employed today, because they prevent the CJEU from contributing to 
legal theory and to systematic development of European law, the CJEU 
often employs purposive considerations, in line with a generally 
functional view of European law.  CJEU judgments reflect the effet utile 
approach, because the main objective in the CJEU’s interpretation and 
development of law is the practical effectiveness of European law. 
 In reality, it is often not easy to distinguish between the teleological 
and the systemic method in the European legal order because “there is a 
clear association between the systemic (context) and teleological 
elements of interpretation in the Court’s reasoning.  It is not simply the 
telos of the rules to be interpreted that matters, but also the telos of the 
legal context in which those rules exist”.33  In the same way, the effet utile 
and the teleological methods also appear to be intertwined, because 
teleological interpretation focuses on the purposes of the EU, and the 
principle of effectiveness is intended to protect these purposes from the 
Member States’ autonomy. 
 Furthermore, because of the particular nature of Treaties, often 
containing vague concepts,34 the CJEU tends to examine the whole 
context in which a particular provision is situated, and to give the 
interpretation which is most likely to further what the Court considers 
that provision sought to achieve.35  For this reason, it may be 
                                                 
 30. On judicial activism, see recently JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AT THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
JUSTICE (Mark Dawson, Bruno de Witte & Elise Muir eds., Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar Publ’g 
2013). 
 31. For a synthesis, cf. Hannes Rösler, Interpretation of EU Law, in JURGEN BASEDOW, 
KLAUS J. HOPT & REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, WITH ANDREAS STIER, THE MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 979-82, at 979 (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford 2012). 
 32. This classification is described in JOXERRAMON BENGOETXEA, THE LEGAL 
REASONING OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 233 (Clarendon Press:  Oxford 1993). 
 33. Luís M. Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law:  Judicial Adjudication in a 
Context of Constitutional Pluralism, in 2 ELEC. J. L. STUD. (2007), http://www.ejls.eu/2/25UK.pdf. 
 34. On vague concepts, see Gianmaria Ajani, The Transplant of Vague Notions, in LIBER 
AMICORUM Z. PETERI, S. ISTVAN TARSULAT 17-37 (Budapest 2005). 
 35. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW:  TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 64 (5th 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press:  Oxford 2011). 
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inappropriate to analyse judicial creativity by focusing on single 
interpretative approaches.  It is difficult and perhaps unreasonable to 
separately identify specific criteria adopted by the CJEU in every 
judgment, partly because the Court, despite sometimes being explicit 
about its interpretative approach, tends to avoid any explicit statement of 
the weight attributed to the various criteria.36  However, it is possible to 
analyse gap filling through the CJEU’s actual practice:  a practice that 
leads us to believe in the emerging existence of a “European equity” that 
construes the law by balancing conflicting principles. 
 The CJEU relies on many principles, mainly of public law origin, 
such as supremacy, proportionality, equal treatment, efficacy, 
effectiveness, non-discrimination, equality and equivalence.  During the 
last decade, the CJEU has also relied on principles pertaining to the 
private law realm, such as nemo venire contra factum proprium, freedom 
of contract, freedom of form, abuse of right, good faith and fair dealing, 
unjust enrichment, restitution and damages. 
 These principles are used to foster the construction of a European 
legal system, towards the final goal of integration.  In other words, the 
CJEU uses principles to fill the gaps in European law with substance, to 
refine existing national laws, and to link the two together, in a unique 
pluralistic legal system that should strive to ensure equity and justice. 
A. In the Beginning Was State Liability 
 One of the fundamental areas of law that has provided particularly 
fertile ground for gap-filling and judicial creativity in general is State 
liability for breach of European Union law.  The European Court of 
Justice has been active in this area since 1991, when it heard the 
Francovich case and first established the conditions under which liability 
gives rise to the right to reparation.37 
 As is well known, the EC Treaty makes no provision on the issue of 
whether Member States may be liable for damages to injured parties for 
breach of EU law.  However, the CJEU intervened to argue that this is 
                                                 
 36. In CILFIT (para. 20), the CJEU stated: 
[E]very provision of community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the 
light of the provisions of community law as a whole, regard being had to the objectives 
thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision in question is to 
be applied. 
This passage was commented on in GERARD CONWAY, THE LIMITS OF LEGAL REASONING AND THE 
EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 24 (Cambridge Univ. Press:  Cambridge 2012). 
 37. Andrea Francovich & Danila Bonifaci & Others v. Italian Republic, Joined Cases C-
6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR I-05357. 
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inherent to the EC Treaty,38 holding that it must be possible to take legal 
action against States to seek damages for breach of EC law.39  
Additionally, the Court clarified the conditions that must be fulfilled for 
the right to reparation to be effective, and applied it to new kinds of 
breaches and to the State’s behaviour in any function or political form.40 
 The purpose of the CJEU was first to establish that States which 
infringe EC law incur liability just as European institutions do (Art. 340 
TFEU, previously Art. 288 TEC).  This, as has been noted by many 
prominent commentators, is another example of the CJEU’s function of 
gap filling.41  In the Brasserie du Pêcheur case, the CJEU stated that 
Community law confers a right to reparation where three conditions are 
met:  (1) the legal rule infringed must be intended to confer rights on 
individuals, (2) the breach must be sufficiently serious, and (3) there 
must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting 
on the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties.42 
 This vagueness, although criticized by scholars, is necessary in 
order to protect the claimant better than Member State law does,43 
enhancing, at the same time, interaction and communication with 
national courts.  In other words, the strategy established by the CJEU, 
based on the minimal guidance provided by these three basic conditions, 
                                                 
 38. Id. para. 37. 
 39. Malcolm Ross, Beyond Francovich, 57 MODERN L. REV. 55-73 (1993). 
 40. As we will see in the following Parts, from the Brasserie du Pêcheur case, the Court 
established that “individuals suffering loss or injury thereby are entitled to reparation where the 
rule of Community law breached is intended to confer rights upon them, the breach is sufficiently 
serious and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage sustained by the 
individuals”.  Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland & The Queen v. Sec’y of 
State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd. & Others, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, [1996] 
ECR I-01029, para. 4. 
 41. Commentators noted that “the tort rules laid down in the two lines of case law, one 
relating to Community institutions and the other relating to Member States, are used by the Court, 
back and forth, as a source of inspiration”.  Walter van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common 
European Law in the Area of Tort Law:  The EU Contribution, in DUNCAN FAIRGRIEVE, MADS 
ANDENAS & JOHN BELL, TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
125-47, at 132 (BIICL:  London 2002).  This analogy produces several consequences. For 
example, the Court ruled that the State is liable whichever of its organs is responsible for the 
breach and regardless of the internal division of powers between constitutional authorities.  Roy 
W. Davis, Liability in Damages for a Breach of Community Law:  Some Reflection on the 
Question of Who To Sue and the Concept of “the State,” 31 EUR. L. REV. 69-80 (2006). 
 42. Brasserie du Pêcheur, para. 51. 
 43. In other words, the CJEU sanctions the State’s failure to act under a test of liability in 
order to pursue the telos of the effectiveness of European law, more than the protection of the 
claimant’s rights.  This is a typical international law feature.  Michele Graziadei, Rights in the 
European Landscape:  A Historical and Comparative Profile, in PRECHAL & VAN ROERMUND, 
supra note 18, at 89 n.18, in relation to the comparison between the stance of the CJEU and 
German law. 
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has permitted progressive extension and clarification of the principle of 
Member State liability, as a result of CJEU creativity, and continuous 
interaction between European Courts and national judges.  This will be 
discussed in greater depth below. 
 However, at this stage, we stress that in the case of State liability the 
aim was to enhance the effectiveness of EU law, also a principle which 
guides interpretation, and which is not limited to making the meaning of 
a rule clear, but also ensures that it be effectively applied or produce the 
desired effects.  Indeed, the CJEU stated that State liability for breach of 
European law should be seen as a necessary corollary of the doctrine of 
direct effect.44  As a result, especially through the principle of 
effectiveness of European law, the principle of Member State liability has 
been progressively clarified and extended through several approaches 
which operate simultaneously. 
 As explained further below, the CJEU used a preliminary ruling to 
extend the principle of State liability and apply its conditions also in the 
case of infringement of European law attributable to a decision by a 
national court adjudicating at last instance.45  The Court filled a gap 
through a teleological interpretation, pursuing an objective already 
identified in the CILFIT case,46 where it “held that Article 234 EC Treaty 
                                                 
 44. Andrea Francovich & Danila Bonifaci & Others v. Italian Republic, Joined Cases C-
6/90 and C-9/90, [1991] ECR I-05357, para. 3: 
The full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection of the 
rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain 
reparation when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a 
Member State can be held responsible.  Such a possibility of reparation by the Member 
State is particularly indispensable where the full effectiveness of Community rules is 
subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence 
of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the rights 
conferred upon them by Community law.  It follows that the principle whereby a State 
must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Community 
law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty.  
A further basis for the obligation of Member States to make good such loss and 
damage is to be found in Article 5 of the Treaty, under which they are required to take 
all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure the implementation of 
Community law, and consequently to nullify the unlawful consequences of a breach of 
Community law. 
 45. In the Köbler case, the CJEU ruled: 
The principle that Member States are obliged to make good damage caused to 
individuals by infringements of Community law for which they are responsible is also 
applicable where the alleged infringement stems from a decision of a court 
adjudicating at last instance where the rule of Community law infringed is intended to 
confer rights on individuals, the breach is sufficiently serious and there is a direct 
causal link between that breach and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties. 
 46. Srl Cilfit & Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, Case C-283/81, [1982] 
ECR I-3415. 
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requires the highest national Court (also ex officio) to refer a case for a 
preliminary ruling if any question of EC Law could be relevant for the 
case to be decided and the answer to that question is not evident (acte 
clair) or already provided by the CJEU (acte éclairé)”.47  Nevertheless, 
national courts have raised some forms of resistance for cultural and 
political reasons which will be analysed below. 
B. The Function of Gap-Filling and the Preliminary Ruling Procedure 
 As mentioned above, the mixed or pluralistic nature of the 
European legal space means that gap-filling also relates to the multilayer 
system of negotiation between CJEU and national courts, established 
along with the transformation of the preliminary ruling procedure.  As is 
well known, in general terms, the CJEU’s arguments and precedents 
influence national law and individuals’ rights through their incorporation 
into the decision-making process of national courts; at the same time, 
national courts should apply European law, filling any gaps and 
reinterpreting European solutions within the national law. 
 This means that the vaguer or more open the European rules as 
interpreted by the CJEU are, the more freedom national courts will enjoy 
in applying them. 
 In order to guarantee  achievement of the goals of European policies 
expressed in the acquis, the CJEU can decide to be more pro-active in 
judging a preliminary ruling.  The transformation of the preliminary 
ruling procedure48 was effected by the CJEU (under the previous Treaties, 
the European Court of Justice) which over the years created the direct 
effect49 and supremacy doctrines.50  The Court achieved the 
                                                 
 47. Peter J. Wattel, Köbler, Cilfit & Welthgrove, We Can’t Go On Meeting Like This, 41 
COMMON MARKET L. REV. 177-90 (2004). 
 48. It was created in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) as part of the 
review role of the Court:  individuals could challenge the validity of High Authority (the 
predecessor of the Commission) decisions in national courts and have these challenges referred 
directly to the Court of Justice.  See KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF 
EUROPEAN LAW:  THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 9 (Oxford Univ. 
Press:  Oxford 2001).  Only with the Treaty of Rome, it was expanded to include questions of 
interpretation, reinforcing the ECJ’s role of filling the gaps, although the Commission remained 
the primary body responsible for interpreting the law and enforcing it. 
 49. It established that European law can create rights for individuals that could be invoked 
before national courts under certain conditions.  The CJEU established rules for when Treaties’ 
provisions, regulations and directives can create (vertical and horizontal) direct effects, for 
example depending on the clarity of the legal text, or the unconditional nature of the obligation.  
See among others, CRAIG & DE BURCA, supra note 35. 
 50. It established that European law is the supreme law and has precedence over national 
law, even subsequent changes of national law:  through revolutionary decisions, the CJEU 
allowed the Court itself and the national courts to monitor and enforce European law in the 
 
 
 
 
2014] JUDICIAL CREATIVITY WITHIN EUROPE 15 
 
metamorphosis by using the techniques of legal interpretation mentioned 
above (from the 1963 Van Gend en Loos case, through Costa v. Enel, and 
then the Simmenthal decision in 1978);51 it granted access to private 
litigants to use European rules in order to challenge national rules and 
policies.  Consequently, this has changed how CJEU decisions have been 
enforced.  As is well known, resistance by some Member State 
constitutional courts towards the supremacy doctrine came to an end in 
the 1980s, when a large majority of national judiciaries agreed to take on 
the role of enforcing European law in national territory.52  The CJEU used 
a teleological approach, where the goal was to foster European 
integration and to increase the effectiveness of the European legal 
system,53 which at times meant creative interpretation of the primary and 
secondary sources of EU law.  Now that the authority of the CJEU is well 
established, the challenge remains of a new phenomenon that is part of 
an emerging system of checks and balances within the European legal 
system. 
C. Conflicting Legal Interpretations in a Multilevel Judicial System 
 As seen, CJEU precedents, based on EU statutory interpretation,54 
formulate fundamental principles through comparison of national legal 
systems:  however, the rhetoric of a Court that “finds the law” in the 
common roots or constitutional traditions of the Member States is a fictio 
juris; in reality the Court creates legal rules by means of judicial 
                                                                                                                  
national setting, stating that Member States cannot escape their obligations by non-compliance.  
See among others, Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403-83 
(1991). 
 51. See Thomas de la Mare & Catherine Donnelly, Preliminary Rulings and EU Legal 
Integration:  Evolution and Stasis, in PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, THE EVOLUTION OF EU 
LAW 363-406 (Oxford Univ. Press:  Oxford, 2d ed. 2011). 
 52. Legal scholars have identified a range of variables that have influenced national 
acceptance of this doctrine:  (1) the influence of the monist doctrine, where international law is 
already part of the national legal system and hierarchically supreme to national law, or the dualist 
doctrine, where international law is not part of the national legal system and requires 
incorporation into national law; (2) the influence of a tradition of judicial review; (3) government 
positions on European integration, because political factors shape judicial interpretation; (4) the 
fact that some States entered the European Economic Community before European law was 
declared supreme to national law:  for example, British legal scholars debated the doctrine of 
supremacy during the accession period, so it was part of what the UK accepted when it joined the 
Community.  See further in ALTER, supra note 48, at 28 ff. 
 53. D. Wincott, The Role or the Rule of the Court of Justice:  An ‘Institutional’ Account 
of Judicial Politics in the European Community, in 2 J. PUB. POL’Y 583-602 (1995); Paul Craig, 
Once upon a Time in the West:  Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC Law, 12 OXFORD J. 
LEG. STUD. 453-79 (1992). 
 54. Among the EU legislative acts, principally Regulations and Directives. 
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activism.  This raises the normative issue of the limits of EU intervention 
in national law to achieve the objectives of market integration. 
 Our concern in this short article is not to define or clarify the notion 
of “principle”, or whether any difference exists, in theoretical terms, 
between “general principles”, “governing principles” and “underlying 
principles” or “overriding principles”.55  As we will demonstrate by 
looking at the CJEU, all the principles mentioned in the judgments are of 
a highly political nature for the protection of human rights, the promotion 
of solidarity and social responsibility, and the enhancement of an 
increasingly consumer-friendly and a socially oriented, common internal 
market.  What is at stake here is the relationship between the European 
market framework, whose core issue is procedural justice56 and the 
fairness of the institutional decision-making process,57 on the one hand, 
and on the other hand national welfare systems, whose concern is 
currently the social exclusion of citizens, workers and consumers, at risk 
of being cut off from labour and consumer markets.58  In other words, the 
EU goal seems to be to break down barriers which limit participation in 
the European market, while the common national goal seems to be to 
correct inequalities and obtain fair results and social peace.  EU 
integration has been regarded as a technical, a-political, process 
concerned with the development of rules to support the internal market, 
rather than a more political process involving debate over socio-political 
perspectives, in order to correct inequalities and to obtain fair results and 
social peace. 
                                                 
 55. On this point, among others, see Simon Whittaker, Operation of the Common 
European Sales Law, 50 (Special Issue) COMMON MARKET L. REV. 85-108 (2013); Koen Lenaerts 
& José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, The Constitutional Allocation of Powers and General Principles of EU 
Law, 47 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1629-69 (2010); Arthur S. Hartkamp, The General Principles 
of EU Law and Private Law, 75 RABELSZ 241-59 (2011); Jürgen Basedow, The Court of Justice 
and Private Law:  Vacillations, General Principles and the Architecture of the European Judiciary, 
18 ERPL 443-75 (2010); Marek Safjan & Przemysław Mikłaszewicz, Horizontal Effect of the 
General Principles of EU Law in the Sphere of Private Law, 18 ERPL 475-86 (2010).  Before, cf. 
EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW MATERIALS FOR A COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE:  TERMINOLOGY, 
GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND MODEL RULES (Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis Mazeaud eds., 
Sellier:  Munich 2008). 
 56. On welfarism in private law, see Thomas Wilhelmsson, Varieties of Welfarism in 
European Contract Law, 10 EUR. L.J. 712-33 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
605144l; WELFARISM IN CONTRACT LAW (Roger Brownsword, Geraint Howells & Thomas 
Wilhelmsson eds., Dartmouth:  Univ. of Michigan 1994). 
 57. See in more general terms, James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice:  Institutional 
Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23 L. & SOCIETY REV. 469-96 (1989). 
 58. Cf. Hans-W. Micklitz, Judicial Activism of the European Court of Justice and the 
Development of the European Social Mode in Anti-Discrimination and Consumer Law, 19 EUI 
LAW 11 (2009); THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Hans-W. 
Micklitz ed., Cheltenham:  Edward Elgar 2011). 
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 Now the growing contentiousness (see below, Fig. 1) around 
sensitive areas of national control (Fig. 2) opens another phase of 
European integration, where conflicting legal interpretations voiced by 
the CJEU, national courts, national governments and the Commission 
play a decisive role in changing the boundaries between national 
sovereignty and European law.59 
Fig. 1.  Reference rates of national judges 
to the CJEU, by years and by countries60. 
                                                 
 59. Cf. Hans-W. Micklitz & Dennis Patterson, From the Nation State to the Market:  The 
Evolution of EU Private Law, 15 EUI LAW 13 ff. (2012).  They identify four parameters to 
describe the interaction between “nation state private law regimes” and “market state European 
private law regimes”:  (1) conflict and resistance, (2) intrusion and substitution, (3) hybridisation 
and (4) convergence. 
 60. Cf. ANNUAL REPORT 2012 OF THE CJEU 98-99, 111-12 (2013), available at http:// 
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2013-
04/192685_2012_6020_cdj_ra_2012_en_proof_01.pdf. 
 Political scientists have noted that the more cross-national economic activity there is, the 
more conflict emerges between national and European law, explaining the growing reference rates 
of national judges to the CJEU in terms of levels of trade flows.  See Jonathan Golub, Modelling 
Judicial Dialogue in the European Community:  The Quantitative Basis of the Preliminary 
References to the ECJ, 58 EUI RSC 17 (1996); Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Brunnel, 
Constructing a Supranational Constitution:  Dispute Resolution and Governance in the European 
Community, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63-80 (1998).  However, this correlation is only one part of 
the story.  The European system, as we said, was not designed to be used by individuals to 
challenge national laws and policies.  Its transformation was due to acceptance of the supremacy 
doctrine and of changing national legal interpretations and practices by the national courts, so that 
national enforcements of the law were no longer incompatible with European supremacy.  See 
ALTER, supra note 48, at 37. 
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Fig. 2.  Cases completed by judgments, by opinions or by orders involving 
a judicial determination; Subject-matter of the action (2008-12) 
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(1) The figures given (gross figures) represent the total number of cases, without account being taken of the 
joinder of cases on the ground of similarity (one case number = one case). 
(2) The heading “Budget of the3 Communities” and “Community own resources have been combined 
under the heading “Financial provisions” for cases brought after 1 December 2009. 
(3) The heading “environment and consumers” has been divided into two separate headings for cases 
brought after 1 December 2009. 
(4) The headings “Common Customs Tariff” and “Customs union” have been combined under a single 
heading for cases brought after 1 December”. 
Cf. ANNUAL REPORT 2012 OF THE CJEU 98-99, 111-12 (2013), supra note 60. 
IV. DOES A “EUROPEAN EQUITY” EXIST? 
 The possible existence of a European equity has fundamental 
importance in the architecture of the European legal system, as well as in 
judicial interaction, as a source of law.  The fact that in CJEU case law 
the term “equity” is not used may depend on various factors:  it does not 
necessarily mean that a European equity or an equitable jurisdiction does 
not operate within the European legal system.  It is obviously important 
to define clearly what we mean by European equity, in relation to the 
common law and civil law meanings, and to draw a distinction between 
European and national levels, a “centralized and diffuse equity” at one 
time. 
 We have developed our idea of a European equity through a 
concrete approach, drawing on the CJEU’s judgments and the reaction of 
the national courts in two areas of law, State Liability and Contracts and 
Consumer Protection, which are of greatest concern to EU citizens 
seeking to shape their economic and social future. 
 Firstly, we suggest that European equity exists in two senses:  both 
in the original Latin meaning as jus est ars boni et aequi (Celsus, one of 
the most prominent jurists of the early second century AD), and in the 
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traditional common law meaning as a concurrent jurisdiction which in 
the past sought to solve disputes and created new remedies (such as 
specific performance and injunction, with the most innovative 
contribution being, of course, trust law) and doctrines (for instance, 
undue influence). 
 The Latin term aequitas in ancient Rome referred to a flexible 
concept with a corrective function used by magistrates (praetores) to 
apply the law in the interest of justice, and not in a mechanical or 
automatic fashion.  The juxtaposition between equity and the law came 
later on:  it was a creation of the glossators, according to whom aequitas 
was the measure of a criticism of the law in case of lacunae and the basis 
of interpretation to fill the gap.61  According to canonists (such as 
Ostiense,62 for example), aequitas always applied, since it was a 
“reasonable way of giving justice”. 
 Although the CJEU does not use the term equity, its adjudication is 
always guided by principles which must be fair.  Europe’s equitable 
adjudication, like aequitas, consists in the exercise of balancing opposing 
principles, through which the CJEU pursues justice.  Its jurisdiction 
transforms the theoretical possibility of participating in the common 
market into a realistic and pragmatic opportunity to eliminate unfair 
results (despite the paternalistic behaviours of Member States).  
Furthermore, the functioning of this European equitable jurisdiction is 
influenced by another key factor:  interaction with national judges.  As 
stated above, it is preliminary rulings which enable this interaction (Art. 
267 TFEU), and which permit European and national judges to influence 
each other in the development and assimilation of principles.  Hence, by 
studying preliminary rulings it is possible to understand the interactive 
and collaborative relationships between the courts established in the 
Treaties, as well as the elements and factors that modify them. 
 As said, it is also possible to identify a European equity in the 
common law sense.  The CJEU’s activity may be compared with that of 
the Court of Chancery which from the 14th century developed doctrines 
and remedies that competed with the common law courts, and 
progressively built an increasingly solid and complex system of rules of 
its own.63  It seems to us that the equity jurisdiction of the Chancellor 
                                                 
 61. See ANTONIO PADOA SCHIOPPA, STORIA DEL DIRITTO IN EUROPA:  DAL MEDIOEVO 
ALL’ETÀ CONTEMPORANEA 198 ff. (Il Mulino:  Bologna 2007). 
 62. The “man from Ostia” was Henry of Susa, famous master of Canon Law at Bologna 
and Paris, who became cardinal and bishop of Ostia in 1261.  Cf. CLARENCE GALLAGHER, CANON 
LAW AND THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY (Università gregoriana editrice:  Roma 1978). 
 63. As Maitland pointed out, equity formally respected every word of the common law 
and every right at law, but where the law was defective equity provided equitable rights and 
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(“the keeper of the King’s conscience”) and the equity of the CJEU share 
a similar function, that is to say the development of remedies and 
doctrines which complete a unique legal system, intervening where other 
sources of law leave lacunae.  A further analogy between the CJEU’s and 
the Chancellor’s jurisdiction is that both courts have developed their 
creative function, but formally they respect the legal order where they 
operate (respectively European legislation and the common law rooted in 
the forms of action and the system of writs). 
 Secondly, we can also find a form of equity in the common law 
sense at national level, in the judicial creativity that national courts show 
when they fill the gaps, a sort of a “diffuse equity”.  National judges are 
in a sense “decentralized European judges”,64 because they must apply 
European law, which means they must interpret and fill gaps in the 
European legal space.65 
V. STATE LIABILITY 
 State liability for breach of European law is a key area where the 
CJEU is guided by the principles of (primacy and) effectiveness of 
European law, and of equivalence and autonomy of Member States 
which interact and temper each other reciprocally.66  The balancing 
                                                                                                                  
remedies.  See FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW:  
TWO COURSES OF LECTURES (CUP Archive 1932).  Even after James I, when the King solved the 
tension between the two rival jurisdictions, according to the maxim “Equity follows the law”, the 
Court of Chancery was bound by the rules established by common law courts.  However, the 
maxim was operative in a “narrow sense”.  In reality, the Chancery Court could use its discretion 
in order to provide relief against abuse of the law or to allay its strictness.  While in ordinary 
circumstances “Equity follows the law” without infringing rights that had been legally acquired, 
that maxim could yield if extraordinary circumstances called for relief. 
 64. Bruno de Witte, Direct Effect, Primacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order, in CRAIG 
& DE BURCA, supra note 51, at 323-62. 
 65. More precisely, 
the national court is charged with ensuring respect for Community law in various ways:  
it is required to apply Community law; it must set aside national legislation 
incompatible with Community law; it is under the duty to interpret national law in 
conformity with Community law; and it is charged with finding a Member State in 
breach of Community law in accordance with the principle of State liability.  In 
essence, the national court serves as the ‘juge de droit commu’ in the Union legal order. 
Koen Lenaerts, The Rule of Law and the coherence of the Judicial System of the European 
Union, 44 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1625–59, at 1645 (2007). 
 66. According to the principle of primacy, CJEU Case C-26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963] 
ECR 3, and the principle of effectiveness, CJEU Case C- 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 
1141, of European law, national procedural rules may not be so framed as to render virtually 
impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights conferred by European law.  In 
conformity with the principle of national procedural autonomy, the CJEU has often stated that it 
is for the “domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction 
and to determine the procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the 
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between these principles in the area of State liability for breach of 
European Law is related to the complex nature of the remedy.  Using 
reparation to protect European citizens whose rights have been violated 
as a result of a breach of European law directly influences the 
relationship between citizens and the Members States to which the 
violation is attributable.  In other words, State liability directly affects the 
complex relationship between the European Union and Member States, 
and recently was even applied to adjudication. 
 It is widely agreed that the CJEU, with the Köbler case, opened a 
new chapter in State liability.  This principle, applied also to judicial 
function, is a reaffirmation of the primacy of European law and of the 
universality of remedies.  On the other hand, it undermines the finality of 
last instance judgments and establishes a more hierarchical relationship 
between the CJEU and national supreme courts.  Hence, with this 
judgment, the point of balance between principles has been shifted in 
favour of the principle of effectiveness of European law.  Especially in 
the Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v Repubblica italiana and 
Commission v. Italy cases,67 the CJEU applied the Köbler precedent even 
more directly, establishing that Italian legislation had imposed 
requirements which were stricter than those of a manifest infringement of 
the applicable law, and for this reason directly violated European law.68  
This is only the most evident case where the CJEU, in directly stating that 
a national law infringes European law,69 has modified the balance 
                                                                                                                  
protection of the rights which citizens have from direct effect of Community law”.  On the other 
hand, this principle is tempered by the principle of equivalence, according to which remedies 
under European law cannot be treated less favourably than remedies under national law.  These 
principles have been studied and applied to State liability, in SCHERMERS & WAELBROCK, supra 
note 15, at 199. 
 67. Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v 
Repubblica italiana, Case C-173/03 [2006] ECR I-05177; European Commission v Italian 
Republic, Case C-379/10, [2011], ECR I-00180. 
 68. Traghetti del Mediterraneo, para. 46: 
Community law precludes national legislation which excludes State liability, in a 
general manner, for damage caused to individuals by an infringement of Community 
law attributable to a court adjudicating at last instance by reason of the fact that the 
infringement in question results from an interpretation of provisions of law or an 
assessment of facts or evidence carried out by that court.  Community law also 
precludes national legislation which limits such liability solely to cases of intentional 
fault and serious misconduct on the part of the court, if such a limitation were to lead to 
exclusion of the liability of the Member State concerned in other cases where a 
manifest infringement of the applicable law was committed, as set out in paragraphs 53 
to 56 of the Köbler judgment. 
 69. For this reason, recently Italian doctrine has been very active in this field.  See 
Giovanni M. Flick, La responsabilità civile dei magistrati. Proposte di modifica fra 
disinformazione e realtà, 11 FEDERALISMI.IT 1-10 (2012); Francesca Bonaccorsi, Clausola di 
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between the Europeanization of remedies and respecting national 
autonomy.  In general, this case demonstrates that the balancing of 
principles can be unbalanced and that there are evident points of 
resistance in national case law.  As is well known, while the CJEU has 
established the three conditions for State liability, the national courts 
must apply them and everything that is not regulated at the European 
level must be regulated at the national level.  This involves many 
important areas, such as “the admissibility of an action, locus standi of 
the applicant, time limits for bringing action, evidential rules, nature or 
categories of damage to be compensated, its assessment, the calculation 
of compensation to be paid, the form of redress, the award of interest”,70 
including anything which has not been laid down by European law.  For 
these reasons the “Francovich doctrine” is assimilated in a rather variable 
way in domestic legal systems. 
 Especially in the last few years, this has been an area of much 
judicial creativity, influenced by two main factors.  Primarily, national 
courts can apply the principle by selecting rules and legal concepts from 
their own national legal order.  This means that their discretion is 
expanded, once the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are 
fulfilled, because actions for damages are in other regards governed by 
national rules on liability.71 
 The vagueness of the three conditions leaves great discretion to 
national judges as regards their concretion, another way to develop 
judicial creativity through progressive application to actual cases.72  
However, the clearest factor encouraging judicial creativity is the 
                                                                                                                  
salvaguardia e responsabilità dello Stato per l’illecito del magistrato, 10 DANNO E 
RESPONSABILITÀ 981-90 (2012); Nicolò Trocker, L’Europa delle Corti sovranazionali:  una storia 
di judicial activism tra tutela dei singoli ed integrazione degli ordinamenti giuridici, in ANNUARIO 
DI DIRITTO COMPARATO E DI STUDI LEGISLATIVI 91-128 (2011); Francesco P. Luiso, La 
responsabilità civile, 10 FORO ITALIANO 285-90 (2011); Maria P. Iadicicco, Integrazione europea e 
ruolo del giudice nazionale, 2 RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO COMUNITARIO 393-446 
(2011); Nicolò Zingales, Member State Liability vs. National Procedural Autonomy:  What Rules 
for Judicial Breach of EU Law?, 11 GERMAN L.J. 419-38 (2010), available at http://www. 
germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1244; Vincenzo Amato, La responsabilità 
dello Stato giudice. Profili civilistici interni, PERSONA E DANNO 1-39 (2010), www. 
personaedanno.it; Antonio Lazari, “Là où est la responsabilité, là est le pouvoir”. Il nuovo ruolo 
del giudice nel paradigma comunitario dopo la sentenza Traghetti, REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA DE 
ESTUDIOS INTERNACIONALES (2008), www.reei.org. 
 70. SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW 293 (Oxford Univ. Press:  N.Y. 2006). 
 71. Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland & The Queen v. Sec’y of 
State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd. & Others, Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, [1996] 
ECR I-01029, para. 67. 
 72. Roberto Caranta, On Discretion, in PRECHAL & VAN ROERMUND, supra note 18, at 196 
(“Liability actions are an almost ideal field for a comparative review of discretion at European 
level.”). 
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vagueness of the condition of the “sufficiently serious breach” of 
European Law, as well as of the first condition, that is the existence of a 
rule intended to confer rights on individuals.73  In particular, the 
“sufficiently serious breach” condition (or, in other words, “whether the 
Member State has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits on its 
discretion”) has been developed and clarified in the “second generation 
of cases”, that is those CJEU judgments which in the last fifteen years 
have progressively clarified the three conditions and extended the 
Francovich remedy to new forms of breach.74  With these judgments, “in 
terms of legal analysis, the Court has concentrated on elaborating the 
condition of seriousness of the breach.  In terms of judicial policy, the 
cases evince a tendency to leave more matters to national courts and, 
perhaps, in some respects a tactical relaxation of liability”.75  
Accordingly, national courts apply the broad concept laid down by the 
CJEU, taking legal content from their own national legal culture, that is 
from the rules of a legal system which they are familiar with, instead of 
from rules which they are not aware of or which they would not be able 
to formulate well.76  As many commentators have pointed out, judges are 
products of specific national legal systems, they absorb specific features 
of their national legal culture, and adopt their own legal reasoning and a 
                                                 
 73. The ambiguity of the division of functions between the CJEU and the national courts, 
as well as the complex application of the three conditions by the English courts, have been 
recently analysed in Paula Giliker, English Tort Law and the Challenge of Francovich Liability:  
20 Years On, 128 L.Q. REV. 541–63, at 551 (2012).  Referring to the second condition, national 
courts only follow guidelines laid down by the CJEU in order to determine whether the threshold 
of seriousness has been reached. 
 74. In Salomone Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, Case C-424/97, 
[2000] ECR I-05123, para. 2, the CJEU stated: 
In order to determine whether a mere infringement of Community law by a Member 
State constitutes a sufficiently serious breach, a national court hearing a claim for 
reparation must take account of all the factors which characterise the situation put 
before it.  Those factors include, in particular, the clarity and precision of the rule 
infringed, whether the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or 
involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, and the fact that 
the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the 
adoption or maintenance of national measures or practices contrary to Community law. 
 75. Takis Tridimas, Liability for Breach of Community Law:  Growing Up and 
Mellowing Down?, in FAIRGRIVE, ANDENAS & BELL, supra note 41, at 151. 
 76. That is a “cryptotype”:  see Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants:  A Dynamic Approach to 
Comparative Law (Installment II of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 343-401, at 387 (1991): 
Normally, a jurist who belongs to a given system finds greater difficulty in freeing 
himself from the cryptotypes of his system than in abandoning the rules of which he is 
fully aware.  This subjection to cryptotypes constitutes the “mentality” of the jurist of a 
given country, and such differences in mentality are the greatest obstacle to mutual 
understanding between judges of different systems.  Cryptotypes may be identified and 
explored only through the use of comparison at a systemic and institutional level. 
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consequent distinctive style of framing and resolving legal questions.77  In 
applying and clarifying the condition of seriousness of breach, the 
balance between principles, and judicial dialogue, operate at maximum 
level.  In fact, the vagueness of this condition and the CJEU’s indicators 
to national judges for determining the seriousness of the infringement 
demonstrate that this is very much the kind of field which can enhance 
the dynamics of incremental cooperation between judges and the 
consequent mutual influence called “cross-fertilisation”.78  Thus judges 
have a double function:  they apply EU criteria and they handle the case 
under their national law.79  Moreover, national courts are not limited to 
applying national law in compliance with European law; they can also 
interpret the remedy according to their national legal structures.80  Hence, 
in the area of State liability some analogies can be seen between 
European judicial cooperation and equity in both the English and in the 
Latin sense.  The wide area of discretion left by the CJEU to national 
autonomy, as well as the three vague conditions, reveal similarities with 
the way the Court of Chancery functioned. 
 However, instead of one court, there are as many “equity courts” as 
there are national legal systems.  Like the relationship between common 
law and equity in England, the relationship between European law and 
                                                 
 77. Moreover, “other features of national legal culture include a particular understanding 
of the role of courts in relation to legislative bodies, differing specifically on the extent to which 
judges ‘make’ law in the process of interpretation and application of legislative provisions and the 
extent to which they can fill the gaps in those provisions”.  Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, The Role of National Courts in the Process of European Integration:  Accounting for 
Judicial Preferences and Constraints, in ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, ALEC STONE SWEET, & JOSEPH 
H.H. WEILER, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND NATIONAL COURTS—DOCTRINE AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 252-76, at 272 (Hart, Oxford 1998). 
 78. Bell, supra note 8, at 165. 
 79. Martina Künnecke, Divergence and the Francovich Remedy in German and English 
Courts, in PRECHAL & VAN ROERMUND, supra note 18, at 233. 
 80. In general terms, they can even decide on the nature of the remedy, applying 
European law directly or some equivalent national rule.  This topic, further discussed at the end of 
this Part, relates to the equivalence of the European principle with the possible equivalent in 
national law.  In Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 26 January 2010, Transportes 
Urbanos y Servicios Generales SAL v. Administración del Estado, Case C-118/08, [2010] ECR I-
00635, the CJEU stated, “In relation to the principle of equivalence, it should be borne in mind 
that, according to settled case law, this requires that all the rules applicable to actions apply 
without distinction to actions alleging infringement of European Union law and to similar actions 
alleging infringement of national law”.  This means that, in order to determine whether the 
principle of equivalence has been complied with, it is necessary to decide whether, in the light of 
their purpose and their essential characteristics, the action for damages brought by the claimant, 
alleging breach of European Union law, and the action that could have been brought through a 
national specific remedy (e.g., a specific remedy for judicial liability), may be regarded as 
similar.  This decision will have many consequences on the rules which must be applied to the 
case, as well as the potential mutual influence between the European and national remedy. 
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national laws has also undergone phases of conflict.  Analysis of judicial 
creativity in the area of Member State liability demonstrates that national 
judges have often raised some form of resistance. 
 There are two reasons for resistance.  Firstly, public liability for 
judicial acts has always met limitations and difficulties at national level.  
Judicial liability has always been an extremely problematic political and 
institutional question, largely due to the principles which characterize the 
judicial function and especially its independence with respect to the other 
constitutional powers.  As is well known, judicial liability has also been 
conditioned by heavy restrictions because of the principles of the 
authority of res judicata and of legal certainty81. 
 Secondly, resistance appears to depend on the fact that, in the area 
of State liability for breach of European law attributable to the courts 
adjudicating at last instance, CJEU judgments can override  national 
courts’ jurisdictional authority; they thus appear to be subjugated to the 
CJEU and their influence undermined within their national and political 
systems. There is a connection here with the so-called “theory of 
interpretive competition” according to which courts have their own 
interests; conflict of interest can constitute a limit for legal integration 
and lead to struggles between levels of the judiciary.82 
 Leaving aside the causes of this resistance, what are its 
consequences?  Analysis of judicial creativity reveals that national courts 
that wish to resist adverse European case law can react primarily by 
treating a harmonized area of law as a form of foreign body.83  In cases of 
Member State liability for breach of European law, this solution has been 
frequent:  national judges have tried to isolate European law in order to 
apply it, avoiding the confluence between European and national law.84  
                                                 
 81. Both these questions were referred to the CJEU in the Köbler case.  For the first time, 
the CJEU seems to have applied comparative methodology in order to arrive at its final ruling.  
Opinion, Advocate General Léger in Case C-224/01, Köbler, para. 77, cited in Kathrin Maria 
Scherr, Comparative Aspects of the Application of the Principle of State liability for Judicial 
Breaches, 12 ERA FORUM 565-88, at 572 (2012).  The same essay analyses the “rather diverse 
spectrum of national legal concepts of public liability for judicial breaches”. 
 82. This is the inter-court competition explanation, which examines courts as 
bureaucracies and sub-bureaucracies with their own interests and bases of institutional support.  
According to this approach, judges share certain interests, and they are primarily interested in 
promoting their independence, influence, and authority. Accordingly, they act strategically vis-à-
vis other courts, “calculating the political context in which they operate so as to avoid provoking  
a response which will close access, remove jurisdiction authority, or reverse their decision”. Cf. 
ALTER, supra note 48, at 46; see also infra Part VI. 
 83. Pierre Larouche & Filomena Chirico, Conceptual Divergence, Functionalism, and the 
Economics of Convergence, in PRECHAL & VAN ROERMUND, supra note 18, at 487. 
 84. One of the fundamental gaps in this field is related to the State’s liability for 
legislation.  The inter-court competition approach also explains the competing interest of lower 
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In the only Italian case where the principle of State liability for judicial 
breach has been applied, the Tribunale di Genova assimilated the 
Francovich doctrine through general liability law (Art. 2043 Civil Code) 
and not through specific regulations regarding judicial liability 
(l.117/88).85  This solution, sustained also by an important doctrinal 
sector,86 can be classified, in our opinion, as an attempt to isolate 
European law, and to block the mutual influence between European and 
national law, which arises as the logical consequence of real integration 
between legal orders.  Scholars are currently studying the consequences 
of this solution that, despite complying with European law,87 constitutes 
an obstacle to real integration between European and national legal 
orders. 
VI. CONTRACTS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 We performed a similar exercise within another area of study, 
contracts and consumer protection88, in order to (1) identify general 
                                                                                                                  
and higher courts with respect to legal integration.  National judges have reacted in varying ways 
because it is a principle not accepted in the majority of European Member States’ domestic law.  
For example, Italian judges have been especially reluctant to apply this principle.  European 
commentators, following national supreme courts’ doctrine (i.e., the Bundesgerichtshof and the 
Corte di Cassazione), assert that Member State liability is a sui generis remedy, separate from 
other national remedies for governmental liability.  Giliker, supra note 73. 
 85. Ruling of the Tribunale di Genova, 23.04.2008. 
 86. Enrico Scoditti, Violazione del diritto dell’Unione europea imputabile all’organo 
giurisdizionale di ultimo grado:  una proposta al legislatore, I FORO ITALIANO, 22-26 (2012); 
Valeria Piccone, La responsabilità del giudice nell’ordinamento integrato, PERSONAEDANNO.IT 1-
16 (2011). 
 87. Some recent Italian contributions on this topic:  Alessandro Comino, La 
responsabilità dello Stato-giudice alla prova del diritto europeo, 3 RESPONSABILITÀ CIVILE E 
PREVIDENZA 776–87 (2012); Luca Leonardi, Accertamento della responsabilità civile dei 
magistrati per le violazioni del diritto comunitario e applicabilità della L. n. 117 del 1988, 4 
GIURISPRUDENZA DI MERITO 991-97 (2010). 
 88. After much (still unresolved) debate, the area of contract law is understood as 
comprising consumer protection as well (both B2B and B2C transactions).  This seems the 
outcome of the so-called Draft Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law, 
developed by the Joint Network on European Private Law:  cf. PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND 
MODEL RULES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (DCFR) 
(Christian von Bar, Eric Clive & Hans Schulte-Nölke eds., Munich:  Sellier, 2d ed. 2009).  It is 
reflected, at national level, in the adoption of a “monist model”, under which rules on consumer 
protection are inserted into a civil code, as in the case of the BGB in Germany (but see the plea 
for the reshaping of consumer law in a special statute, outside the BGB:  Hans-W. Micklitz, The 
Future of Consumer Law—Plea for a Movable System, 2 J. EUR. CONSUMER & MARKET L. 5-11 
(2013).  It is less evident in other countries that adopted a “dualist model”, i.e., a Consumer Code 
separate from the Civil Code, as in the case of France, Italy and Spain, for example.  Although 
English private law remains largely uncodified, the question of whether consumer law and 
contract law can be addressed together in one statute has been an issue at times (see for instance 
the Sales of Goods Act 1979).  Recently, however, the UK has announced a new “Consumer 
Rights Bill” (to be presented before 2015, in the current Parliament):  the specific consumer-
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principles through which the CJEU “pursues justice” (Art. 2 TUE, Art. 
19 TUE) and (2) find the legal rules generated by those general 
principles as a result of the interpretation of the Court. 
 The CJEU clearly pursues justice in the sense of just and fair 
solutions, resulting from a balance between interacting and conflicting 
principles, for a given case.  The role of the CJEU is to balance interests 
beyond those principles, and achieve equilibrium between opposing 
forces:  from this perspective, “justice” shares the same root as the Latin 
term aequitas and a part of the meaning.  The equitable solutions of the 
CJEU are quite similar to the way jus was applied in ancient Rome to 
achieve aequitas:  using the law in its dynamic and open dimension, in 
pursuit of what is bonum, that is to say right, and what is aequum, that is 
to say fair. 
 Justice acquires substance through principles, which generate 
detailed rules as a result of the interpretation of the courts.89  From the 
start, the Court of Justice explicitly stated that “unless the Court is to 
deny justice, it is therefore obliged to solve the problem by reference to 
the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writings and the 
case law of the Member countries”.90  More than once the Court of 
Justice has affirmed that in order to establish whether a particular 
principle is to be considered common to all, it is not sufficient to 
consider the textual data of the written law, but “it is necessary to 
consider also the indications provided by the constitutional rules and 
practices of the nine Member States”.91 
                                                                                                                  
related provisions of the Sales of Goods Act 1979 would be rewritten as part of this new act, 
which would provide an opportunity to bring together a range of measures implementing the 
various directives, as well as the enforcement provisions from the Enterprise Act 2002, and 
provisions of criminal law sanctions found in the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading 
Regulations 2008.  “It does, of course, require careful consideration about how the interface 
between consumer law and general private law should be handled”:  Christian Twigg-Flesner, 
Comment on “The Future of Consumer Law:  Plea for a Movable System”, 2 J. EUR. CONSUMER 
& MARKET L. 1, 12-14 (2013). 
 89. On the function of principles, see TAKIS TRIDIMAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE 
EU LAW (Oxford 2006) (interpretative, derogating and supplementing functions); to compare 
with Carla Sieburgh, Principles in Private Law:  From Luxury to Necessity—Multi-Layered 
Legal Systems and the Generative Force of Principles, 20 ERPL 295-312, at 300 (2012) (who, to 
those functions, added the generative function).  The entire issue 2/2012 of the ERPL is focused 
on principles and the law. 
 90. Cf. Joined Cases C-7/56, 3/57 to 7/57, Algera & Others v. Common Assembly of the 
European Coal & Steel Cmty., [1957] ECR I-81. 
 91. Cf. § 20 of the judgment in Liselotte Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, Case C-44/79, 
[1979] ECR I-3727. 
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 In the area of contracts and consumer protection, the occasional 
reference to “general principles and their impact on private law”,92 or to 
“principles of private law”,93 came later as regards the area of State 
Liability:  for instance with the Bellone case (1998),94 and the Leitner 
case (2002).95  It has continued in recent decisions, such as the Mangold 
case (2005),96 the Hamilton case (2008),97 the Messner case (2009),98 the 
Sturgeon case (2009),99 and the Kücükdeveci case (2010).100 
 From the easily acceptable principle of freedom of form expressed 
in the field of commercial agency contracts such as B2B transactions 
(Bellone), the CJEU stated a more controversial principle, that of 
compensation for non-material damage resulting from the non-
performance or improper performance of the services constituting a 
package holiday (Leitner), then clarified the role of the principle of good 
faith in distance contracts (Messner) within B2C transactions.  The CJEU 
also applied the principle of non-discrimination on the grounds of age in 
employment contracts (Mangold and Kücükdeveci),101 and finally it 
                                                 
 92. The Treaties recognize fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law [see Art. 6(3) TEU] and establish that general principles, common to 
the laws of the Member States, shall apply in the case of non-contractual liability [see Art. 340(2) 
TFEU]. 
 93. For a comprehensive analysis, Chantal Mak, Hedgehogs in Luxemburg?  A 
Dworkinian Reading of the CJEU’s Case Law on Principles of Private Law and Some Doubts of 
the Fox, 20 ERPL 323-46 (2012).  According to Mak, the first example of a case in which we 
find a clear reference to “principles of civil law” is Société thermale d’Eugénie-les-Bains v. 
Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, Case C-277/05, [2007] ECR I-6415. 
 94. Case C-215/97, [1998] ECR I-2191, para. 15; see Esther Arroyo i Amayuelas, 
Barbara Pasa & Antoni Vaquer Aloy, Form, in ACQUIS PRINCIPLES, CONTRACT II:  GENERAL 
PROVISIONS, DELIVERY OF GOODS, PACKAGE TRAVEL AND PAYMENT SERVICES comments to art. 1-
304, 75 ff. (Munich:  Sellier 2009). 
 95. Case C-168/00, [2002] ECR I-2631. 
 96. Case C-144/04, [2005] ECR I-9981; cf. Malte Beyer-Katzenberger, Judicial Activism 
and Judicial Restraint at the Bundesverfassungsgericht:  Was the Mangold Judgement of the 
European Court of Justice an Ultra Vires Act?, 11 ERA FORUM 517–23 (2011); Michael Dougan, 
In Defence of Mangold?, in A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF STATES?  ESSAYS IN EU LAW IN 
HONOUR OF ALAN DASHWOOD 219-44 (Anthony Arnull, Catherine Barnard, Michael Dougan & 
Eleanor Spaventa eds., Hart Publ’g 2011). 
 97. Case C-412/06, [2008] ECR I-2383. 
 98. Case C-489/07, [2009] ECR I-7315. 
 99. Joined Cases C-402 & 432/07, [2009] ECR I-10923. 
 100. Case C-555/07, [2010] ECR I-365. 
 101. The CJEU applied the principle of non-discrimination also on the grounds of sexual 
orientation:  cf. the Römer case (Case C-147/08, [2011] ECR I-3591).  In the Römer judgment, 
the CJEU reaffirmed (after the Maruko case, Case C-267/06, [2008] ECR I- 01757) equal 
treatment for married couples of the same sex and registered partners of the same sex in the area 
of social security law.  See Laurent Pech, Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance:  The 
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recognized a general “principle of limitation”,102 placing a time-limit on 
exercise of the right of withdrawal (Hamilton), and the principle of 
compensatory damages for delay, or loss of time (Sturgeon),103 once again 
in B2C transactions. 
 The Sturgeon case is a striking example of creative judicial activism 
where the CJEU even re-drafted a piece of European legislation 
differently from the EU legislature, to the advantage of customers.104  The 
preliminary ruling related to Regulation n. 261/2004 that established 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event 
of denied boarding, flight cancellations, or long flight delays.  The 
Regulation grants, in case of cancellation, a number of rights to 
passengers, including compensation, while in case of delayed flights 
compensation is not provided for.  The CJEU held that these provisions 
were against the equal treatment principle, which requires that 
comparable situations must not be treated differently, and different 
situations must not be treated in the same way, unless such treatment is 
objectively justified.  The CJEU argued that the situation of passengers 
whose flights are delayed is comparable with the situation of passengers 
whose flights are cancelled, because a “long delay” (interpreted 
contextually within the “extraordinary circumstances”, Recital 15 of the 
Regulation) results in a comparable “loss of time” suffered equally by 
both types of passengers.  The Court then decided that the damage 
should be redressed by compensation.  The Regulation was not annulled, 
but interpreted broadly, to justify a conclusion that was contrary to the 
literal interpretation of the Regulation itself.  In this case, the Court 
demonstrated that it is willing to “oppose the free market to the 
advantage of consumers”.105 
                                                                                                                  
Court of Justice’s Sidestepping of Fundamental Constitutional Issues in Römer and Dominguez, 
49 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1841-80, at 1842 (2012). 
 102. Cf. Maduro, supra note 33. 
 103. See Karl Riesenhuber, Interpretation and Judicial Development of EU Private Law:  
The Example of the Sturgeon-Case, 6 ERCL 384-408 (2010); Sacha Garben, Sky-High 
Controversy and High-Flying Claims?  The Sturgeon in Light of Judicial Activism, 
Euroscepticism and Eurolegalism, 50 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 15-46 (2013). 
 104. Cf. scholars’ reactions in different Member States:  John Balfour, Airline Liability for 
Delays:  The Court of Justice of the EU Rewrites EC Regulation 261/2004, 35 AIR & SPACE L. 71-
75 (2010); Luis González Vaqué, Reglamento nº 261/2004 sobre asistencia y compensación de 
los pasajeros aéreos:  el TJCE clarifica (ma non troppo) los conceptos de retraso y cancelación de 
un vuelo, 3 UNIÓN EUROPEA ARANZADI 7-17 (2010); Jules Stuyck, Indemnisation pour les 
passagers de vols retardés en Europe, 7 LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 359-63 (2010); Antonio Leandro, 
Passeggeri con diritto al rimborso forfettizzato anche quando il volo ha un ritardo di tre ore, 49 
GUIDA AL DIRITTO 111-13 (2009). 
 105. Garben, supra note 103, at 36. 
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 Clearly, as said above, the CJEU has been one of the key actors in 
the creation of the internal market, engaging in both negative integration, 
with the dismantlement of national barriers to promote free competition 
inside the common market, and positive integration, through the 
principle of mutual recognition.  Although in the past the CJEU has been 
involved in a “neo-liberal creation of the European space for free 
movement”, nevertheless at present it is moving to counterbalance some 
bias in this process, to promote the anti-discrimination test on grounds of 
nationality, of age, and of gender, acting also in the private law domain as 
a “socially activist Court”.106  On this last point, we must add that it is 
impossible to predict whether the CJEU is ready to take responsibility for 
promoting social welfare within the market arena.107 
 Nevertheless, these recent judgments are interesting because they 
explore the boundaries of the CJEU’s function in relation to the political 
process.108  The CJEU has applied general principles that are to be found 
within the common legal traditions of Member States or European law, 
but often circumventing the intentions of the European legislature.  As a 
consequence,  the first criticism against the Court’s activism is the 
“horizontal separation of powers” objection:  the judiciary should respect 
the prerogatives of the democratically elected legislature.  The second 
criticism is the “vertical separation of powers” objection:  by trespassing 
the limit of its judicial function, the CJEU as a supranational judiciary 
creates law extrapolating rules from (allegedly) common general 
principles to the detriment of national courts, especially with respect to 
their independence and other constitutional powers.109  The democratic 
deficit  arguments have been analysed in the recent past, while the 
position of national courts in relation to the supranational judiciary has 
been examined less; at various times their relationship has been 
described as cooperative, conflictual, and negotiational.  What can 
national courts do? 
                                                 
 106. Id. at 37. 
 107. Cf. THE MANY CONCEPTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, supra note 
58.  For an early critique of the technical, neutral and apolitical character of the European 
Contract Law projects, see Social Justice Study Grp., Social Justice in European Contract Law:  
A Manifesto, in 10 EUR. L.J. 653-74 (2004); Ugo Mattei & Fernanda G. Nicola, A ‘Social 
Dimension’ in European Private Law?  The Call for Setting a Progressive Agenda, 7 GLOBAL 
JURIST (Frontiers) art. 2 (2007), available at http://www.bepress.com/gj/vol7/iss1/art2.  For 
outcomes, see Martin W. Hesselink, CFR & Social Justice (Centre for the Study of European 
Contract Law, Working Paper Series No. 2008/04), available at http://www.sssup.it/Upload 
Docs/3330_SSRN_ID1152222_code764687.pdf. 
 108. Cf. Niels Baeten, Judging the European Court of Justice:  The Jurisprudence of 
Aharon Barak Through a European Lens, 18 COLUMBIA J. EUR. L. 135-55, at 148 (2011). 
 109. Cf. supra Part V. 
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 The Wünsche judgment110 made it clear that a national court can 
make further reference to the CJEU when it does not understand how to 
apply the rule expressed in the CJEU decision; but the national court 
cannot use this right to refer further questions to the CJEU to contest the 
validity of its precedents.  This would undermine the respective areas of 
jurisdiction of national courts and of the CJEU.111  However, it is true that 
national courts can dissent without further reference to the CJEU:  they 
can simply decide not to apply the CJEU precedent to the case, entering 
into conflict with the authority of the CJEU.  Differing behaviours may 
be observed in national courts:  traditionally the courts of last instance 
resist and the lower courts follow the CJEU’s precedents. 
 Lower national courts usually support the activism of the CJEU.  
Lower courts are generally willing to apply CJEU precedents, for various 
reasons.  Firstly, by adhering to the Court’s precedent and applying the 
principle of supremacy and direct effect, lower national courts can bypass 
the national judicial hierarchy, and overturn the judgments of the 
supreme national courts.  Secondly, the lower courts seem less 
constrained by the specific duty to protect the national Constitution and 
to guarantee predictability and legal certainty (at least in civil law 
systems where the stare decisis rule does not operate), contrary to the 
higher courts within the Member States.112 
 However, the Sturgeon saga, the heated controversy that developed 
in Germany, the UK and the Netherlands after the Sturgeon judgment in 
2011, showed a surprising resistance in lower national courts:  in 
particular, German and English courts decided to suspend any claim in 
respect to compensation for delay, until the CJEU provided additional 
justification to Sturgeon, deciding other preliminary rulings.113  The 
                                                 
 110. Case C-69/85, [1986] ECR I-947; see also Art. 104(5) of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Court of Justice, OJ EU L 265/1, 29.9.2012, in line with Art. 43 of the Statute of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, OJ EU C 83/210, 30.03.2010. 
 111. Cf. the Order of the President of the CJEU of 17 January 2013 a propos of the Van de 
Ven case (Case C-315/11, discussed in Garben, supra note 103, at 31), ordering that the case be 
removed from the Register (OJ EU C 108/18, 13.4.2013).  Thus, the CJEU is not going to decide 
on those preliminary rulings after Sturgeon which could have been considered against the 
Wünsche doctrine. 
 112. Cf. De Witte, supra note 64; Karen J. Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of 
European Court Jurisprudence:  A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, in 
SLAUGHTER, STONE SWEET & WEILER, supra note 77, at 232. 
 113. The preliminary rulings came from the High Court of Justice (England & Wales) 
Queen’s Bench Division (Admin. Court), Case C-629/10, TUI Travel plc., and from the 
Landgericht of Köln, Case C-413/11, Germanwings. 
 The first, the TUI Travel case, was decided in October 2012 (Joined cases C-581/10 & 
629/10, [2012], not yet published) reiterating the interpretation of the EU Regulation already 
given in Sturgeon:  the principle of equal treatment requires all passengers whose flights are 
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CJEU confirmed its decision in Nelson (and others) and TUI Travel (and 
others) in 2012, adding that delay does not entitle passengers to 
compensation if the air carrier can prove that “long delay” is caused by 
extraordinary circumstances (for example, when it goes beyond the 
actual control of the air carrier). 
 What is worth noting in this web of controversies is that judicial 
activism is amplified at national level by the more fuzzy judicial activism 
of the lower national courts that can boycott the judgments of the CJEU, 
although Art. 4 TEU imposes a general duty of loyalty on national and 
supranational institutions to give full effect to EU law.  Consistency 
would demand that a lower court should be bound by the CJEU 
interpretation and should not re-interpret this again.114 
 On the other hand, it is true that most national supreme courts or 
constitutional courts today support the activism through “self-
empowerment of the CJEU”,115 because they prefer to use a consistent 
interpretation (for example, through the reading in/out, reading down 
techniques of the legal rules contained in Directives’ transposition 
measures), rather than annulment or dis-application of a rule. 
 In fact, an interpretation in conformity with one of the general 
principles, such as equal treatment in the Sturgeon case, from which the 
Court derives the rule of compensatory damages for loss of time, or such 
as prohibition of discrimination on grounds of age in the Mangold case, 
through which it recognizes the standard of good faith, is more 
deferential and respectful of the legislative process than an annulment 
would have been. 
 The crux of the controversy lies in the fact that the CJEU’s 
contextual and teleological interpretations of principles used to fill the 
gaps highlight that law and policy considerations should go together.  
They should also both be reasonable, consistent and adequate to serve the 
interests of the citizens.  They should be debated in a broader institutional 
framework. 
                                                                                                                  
delayed and those whose flights are cancelled to be treated equally, because they suffer the same 
loss of time, which is not governed by the Montreal Convention on certain rules on international 
carriage by air (signed 28 May 1999).  The second, the Germanwings case, was decided in April 
2013 (Case C-413/11, [2013], OJ EU C 225/41, 3.8.2013), with the Order of the Court (Ninth 
Chamber) stating that the interpretation given in the judgment of Sturgeon extending, by analogy, 
the right to compensation to delay to a flight, “has no bearing on the principle of the separation of  
powers in the European Union”.  For an overview, cf. also Caspar Zatschler, European Union 
Litigation, 8 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 456–69 (2012). 
 114. A common idea in the U.K.:  FRANCIS BENNION, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 167 ff. 
(London, 5th ed. 2008); already in RUPERT CROSS & JAMES W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH 
LAW 178 ff. (Clarendon Press:  Oxford, 4th ed. 1991). 
 115. Garben, supra note 103, at 34. 
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A. On Law and Policy 
 The judiciary is a bureaucracy, not only an epistemic community:  
judges are civil servants working for the State.116  The neo-functionalist 
approach117 recognised that judges, like all actors in a legal system, 
pursue their self-interest; but it is unclear how to define this “judicial 
self-interest”.118  Legalism failed with its assumption that legal reasoning 
is conclusive and that it alone shapes judicial behaviour:  legal texts and 
legal methods alone can seldom resolve interpretative disagreement.  
Neo-realism failed because it misidentifies how political factors shape 
judicial behaviour, overstating the link between judges and the national 
interest. 
 A theory of judicial interests has been outlined starting from the 
assumption that political interests are inherent to the legal process and 
that in this process some actors win while others lose.  Judges’ specific 
interests are primarily their independence (legal autonomy from political 
bodies), their authority (the court is a strategic actor in calculating the 
political context in which it operates, so as to avoid the risk of provoking 
a reaction that reverses its decision) and their influence (the ability to 
make decisions that influence the policy process); these are the key 
factors which qualify the judiciary.119 
 This means that the twenty-eight judiciaries of the Member States 
plus the CJEU are not neutral arbiters in the process of adjudication.  
Adjudication requires value judgments, which will inevitably be political.  
When resolving gaps, conflicts or ambiguities in a system of legal rules, 
judges make new rules and apply them to the facts.  While judges present 
themselves as neutral, operating under the fidelity-to-law doctrine, many 
allegedly neutral judicial opinions are not convincingly so.120  This raises 
                                                 
 116. In Europe, the selection and appointment of judges is not political (as in the U.S.), but 
depends on academic qualifications and practical experience, and (in civil law countries) on a 
state exam as well.  See ALTER, supra note 48, at 47; DANIELA PIANA, JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITIES 
IN NEW EUROPE (Farnham:  Asghate 2010); BELL, supra note 19. 
 117. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court, 47 INT’L ORG. 41-76 
(1993). 
 118. Accordingly, the CJEU’s legal logic could not shape national courts’ behaviour.  
Through the neo-functionalist approach, the European legal system has expanded and prospered 
by creating individual incentives to motivate actors within European institutions and within 
national legal systems, to promote legal integration.  Alter, supra note 112, at 227-52. 
 119. ALTER, supra note 48, at 45 ff. 
 120. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) 29 ff. (Cambridge:  
Harv. Univ. Press 1997), distinguishes five general strategies dealing with the question.  The first 
strategy (neutrality) is associated with classical positivism of Hart; the second one, associated 
with Kelsen, Unger and others, shows the opposite, i.e., that the application of a rule cannot be 
isolated from subjective influences; the third position, associated with Oliver W. Holmes, accepts 
that what is not rule application is at least methodologically indistinguishable from judicial 
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the question of what really determines operational rules, beyond 
arguments claiming to be based on principles used by judges.121 
 It is particularly curious that in the area of Contracts and Consumer 
Protection the CJEU omits any reference to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, given that the 
Charter “has the same legal value as the Treaties” (Art. 6(1) TEU).  As a 
primary source of EU law, any reference to it by the CJEU in its 
judgments would render the judicial activism of the CJEU more 
acceptable:  the judges sitting in national courts may be more willing to 
enforce a Charter, a Constitution, containing principles and rules, 
disregarding any national provision contrary to it, if necessary, than to 
follow CJEU precedents based on general principles.  An express 
reference to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as the main 
source of principles,122 both in private and public law, could legitimize, 
within the separation of powers doctrine, the judicial activism of the 
CJEU.  In its rulings, the CJEU could justify the application of a 
particular principle as a Charter principle, thus clarifying the legal status 
of general principles it applies in adjudication. 
 This approach would reassure national courts and governments, 
who would feel the “horizontal separation of powers” threat to a lesser 
                                                                                                                  
legislation; the fourth position associated with Cardozo, Llewellyn, Fuller, Hart and Sacks, to 
Dworkin, proposes a middle term in between rule application and judicial legislation, through the 
method of “coherence” or “fit”, a method that is focused on the choice among different proposed 
rules to fill the gap (the judge is making law, but without consulting his own preferences, because 
he/she is following a prior case or other rules of the system enacting the system itself, in other 
words, he is following a rational plan); a fifth position, that Kennedy called the civil law version 
of adjudication, addresses the problem from the presumption that the Code is the coherent 
framework with a particular conceptual structure, and when the case cannot be solved by 
semantic or deductive analysis then the judge will apply a teleological approach, in order to 
disclose the social purpose of the norm. 
 121. The distinction between operational rules and legal concepts (i.e., symbolic sets of 
rules) implies that it is necessary to deconstruct the law beyond the peculiar legal discourse of one 
legal system, in order to understand how the legal actors of the system are working.  Cf. Sacco, 
supra note 76.  The phenomenon is explained through the theory of legal formants which are all 
those formative elements that make any given legal rule (such as statutes, general propositions, 
particular definitions, judgments, reasons, holdings, customs, and usage).  All of these formative 
elements are not necessarily coherent with each other within each system.  Only domestic jurists 
assume such a coherence.  On the contrary, legal formants are usually conflicting and can better 
be pictured in a competitive relationship with one another.  Thus, within a given legal system, the 
rules are not uniform, not only because one rule may be given by case law, another by scholars 
and yet another one by statutes.  Within each one of these sources  formants also compete with 
each other. 
 122. See, for example, Art. 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights containing the anti-
discrimination principle or Art. 38 on the high level of  protection for consumers.  Recent 
Directives and Regulations refer, in their recitals, to the Charter so as to ensure compliance of the 
secondary legislation with the Charter. 
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extent.  At the same time, it would not irritate common lawyers, because 
the new “common law as an interpretation of a statute”, also called 
“statute-based common law”, is gaining importance in daily adjudication 
of private law claims in England.123  This approach would turn out to be 
the visible expression of the ongoing  “constitutionalisation” of private 
law relationships:  what matters is doing justice for the parties in the 
case.124 
B. On Law and Facts 
 Differences continue to exist among Member States’ legal systems.  
This is not necessarily because national judges do not accept certain 
principles of private law that other national courts do, or because they 
interpret them not in conformity with European law.  The case of good 
faith illustrates this point well.  The general view among commentators 
appears to be that in English contract law a principle of good faith of 
general application is absent.125  However, as Mr. Justice Leggatt noted 
recently126: 
                                                 
 123. See Andrew S. Burrows, The Relationship between Common Law and Statute in the 
Law of Obligations, 128 L.Q. REV. 232-59, at 240 (2012).  Statute law cannot have the effect of 
freezing or turning back the development of the common law; moreover, statute law can be used 
by analogy in developing the common law (as the interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998 
gave stimulus to stronger protection of privacy for breach of confidence, see Campbell v. Mirror 
Group of Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22).  This is not to be confused with the different idea of 
“equity of the statute”.  The mediaeval idea, which raised a different question as to how far one 
can interpret a statue by analogy, fell out of favour in the eighteenth century because it allowed 
much room for the courts to enlarge statutes so as to apply them to situations that were not 
covered by the words of the statutes but were regarded by the courts as within the spirit of the law 
and analogous.  See Patrick S. Atiyah, Common Law and Statute Law, 48 MLR 1, 7 ff. (1985).  
Against this view, some commentators have noted that the two processes merely differ in degree 
and not in kind.  MacCormick wrote that the process of reasoning from or with precedents is not 
radically different from that of reasoning from or with statutes:  the differences are in fact at most 
differences of degree, not in kind.  Cf. NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL 
THEORY 213 (Oxford 1978); cf. also NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, INTERPRETING 
STATUES:  A COMPARATIVE STUDY 178 ff. (London 1991). 
 124. Burrows, supra note 123, at 247. 
 125. HUGH BEALE, CHITTY ON CONTRACT LAW vol. 1, para. 1-039, at 31 ff. (Sweet & 
Maxwell Ltd., 31st ed. 2012).  On the “traditional English hostility” towards the doctrine of good 
faith, see also EWAN MCKENDRICK, CONTRACT LAW 221 ff. (Palgrave Macmillan, 9th ed. 2011).  
Cf. the following observations of Bingham LJ, in Interfoto Picture Library Ltd v. Stiletto Visual 
Programmes Ltd [1989] 1 QB 433 at 439: 
In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law 
world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in 
making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith.  This does not 
simply mean that they should not deceive each other, a principle which any legal 
system must recognise; its effect is perhaps most aptly conveyed by such metaphorical 
colloquialisms as ‘playing fair’, ‘coming clean’ or ‘putting one’s cards face upwards on 
the table.’  It is in essence a principle of fair open dealing . . . English law has, 
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It would be a mistake, moreover, to suppose that willingness to recognise a 
doctrine of good faith in the performance of contracts reflects a divide 
between civil law and common law systems or between continental 
paternalism and Anglo-Saxon individualism.  Any such notion is gainsaid 
by that fact that such a doctrine has long been recognised in the United 
States.  The New York Court of Appeals said in 1918:  “Every contract 
implies good faith and fair dealing between the parties to it”:  Wigand v 
Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co, 222 NY 272 at 277.  The Uniform 
Commercial Code, first promulgated in 1951 and which has been adopted 
by many States, provides in section 1-203 that “every contract or duty 
within this Act imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or 
enforcement.”127  Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states in 
section 205 that ‘every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement’.128  . . . “Under 
English law a duty of good faith is implied by law as an incident of certain 
categories of contract, for example contracts of employment and contracts 
between partners or others whose relationship is characterised as a 
fiduciary one.  I doubt that English law has reached the stage, however, 
where it is ready to recognise a requirement of good faith as a duty implied 
by law, even as a default rule, into all commercial contracts.  Nevertheless, 
there seems to me to be no difficulty, following the established 
methodology of English law for the implication of terms in fact, in 
implying such a duty in any ordinary commercial contract based on the 
presumed intention of the parties . . . .  As a matter of construction, it is 
hard to envisage any contract which would not reasonably be understood as 
requiring honesty in its performance.  The same conclusion is reached if 
the traditional tests for the implication of a term are used.  In particular the 
requirement that parties will behave honestly is so obvious that it goes 
                                                                                                                  
characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed 
piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness. 
 126. Yam Seng Pte Ltd v. Int’l Trade Corp Ltd [2013] EWHC 111 (QB), 01/02/2013.  It 
was a claim for breach of contract and misrepresentation, brought by YSP, a distributor in 
Singapore, against ITC, an English supplier.  The goods in question were some fragrances bearing 
the brand name of the football team “Manchester United”.  The distribution agreement gave YSP 
the exclusive right to promote and sell these products in duty-free markets throughout Far East 
and China.  At the time the agreement was entered into, however, the English supplier ITC had 
not yet acquired all the rights it purported to license.  The issue at stake is whether an implied 
term in the agreement that the parties would deal with each other in good faith exists. 
 127. According to Douglas G. Baird, Pre-Contractual Disclosure Duties Under the 
Common European Sales Law, 50 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 297-310, at 298 (2013), the UCC 
was remarkably successful in unifying the commercial law of fifty different jurisdictions and 
good faith and fair dealing is entirely in the mainstream of the American commercial law 
tradition. 
 128. See the judgment, Yam Seng Pte Ltd, para. 125. 
 
 
 
 
40 TULANE EUROPEAN & CIVIL LAW FORUM [Vol. 29 
 
without saying.  Such a requirement is also necessary to give business 
efficacy to commercial transactions.129 
So judges can react differently to the intrusion of EU law, but differences 
will not come from the traditional civil law vs. common law division. 
 This is well illustrated by the CJEU’s judgments on the “unfairness” 
of terms in consumer contracts under Art. 3(1) of Directive 93/13.130  In 
order to substantially define the concept of unfair term, the CJEU set out 
indications and provided guidance to national courts as to how to apply 
the interpretation provided in response to requests for a preliminary 
ruling; but it did not rule on the application of these general criteria in a 
given case, because “it is for the national court to decide whether a 
contract term is unfair”.131 
 The CJEU’s judgments are always related to a preliminary ruling on 
a concrete fact, which occurred in one of the Member States, brought to 
the attention of a national judge through a judicial claim.  Then the 
explanation of the significance of what is contrary to the requirement of 
good faith causing a significant imbalance of the parties’ rights and 
obligations arising from the contract, is left to national courts, because it 
requires an assessment of the particular legal context, to be balanced 
against any other relevant elements (such as the nature of goods and 
services for which the contract was concluded, all the circumstances 
attending the conclusion of the contract and all the other terms of the 
contracts, or of another contract on which it is dependent), according to 
Art. 4(1) Dir. 93/13.  Accordingly, although Member States currently 
seem to converge towards acceptance of a general duty of “good faith 
and fair dealing” in contracting, national courts may seize on the wording 
of this general standard and use the metaphorical open texture language 
                                                 
 129. See id. paras. 131, 137. 
 130. Cf. Jules Stuyck, Unfair Terms, in MODERNISING AND HARMONISING CONSUMER 
CONTRACT LAW 115 ff. (Geraint Howells & Reinhard Schultze eds., Munich:  Sellier 2009). 
 131. Cf. Freiburger judgment, Case C-237/02, [2004] ECR I-3403, overruled to the 
Océano Grupo Editorial judgment, Case C-240-244/98, [2000] ECR I-4941, where the CJEU was 
willing to hold a term unfair in a consumer contract under Directive 93/13.  Cf. recently the 
Pereničová and Perenič judgment, Case C-453/10 [2012], nyr; Invitel judgment, Case C-472/10, 
[2012], nyr; Banco Español de Crédito judgment, Case C-618/10 [2012], nyr; and also the RWE 
Vertrieb AG judgment, Case C-92/11 [2013], nyr. 
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of good faith,132 leaving unchanged the existing discrepancies among 
national legal systems.133 
 There remains considerable room for increasing judicial 
intervention, notwithstanding the CJEU’s detailed guidance.  Thus, the 
attempt to balance the plurality of values and principles underlying 
private law with the goal of substantive justice leaves a great margin of 
appreciation to national judges, who give effect to the principles at 
national levels.134 
C. On Law and Politics 
 Not surprisingly, the implicit recognition of good faith in all 
commercial contracts also within common law systems emerged after the 
development of the controversial DCFR, the well-known “tool-box” for 
harmonizing European private law,135 and the Proposed Regulation on the 
optional instrument for European Sales Law, the CESL.136  In these 
instruments, which are preparing the way for a European Restatement (or 
codification)137 of contract (or private) law, “good faith and fair dealing” 
is a recognized principle, based on Treaties, such as the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.138  Following European scholars 
on this point, CJEU case law is showing that, at least in the inter-related 
field of Contracts and Consumer Protection, principles of private law are 
used to mediate the liberal perspective with the socially-oriented 
approach:  thus, for example, the principle of freedom of contract is to be 
balanced with the good faith and fair dealing principle, where the latter is 
used as a rule of interpretation for the “moralization” of contract law.139 
 Conflicting interests, that is a high level of economic performance 
on one side, and public policies aimed at protecting disadvantaged 
                                                 
 132. See Carla Balzanella, Lucia Morra, Piercarlo Rossi, Metaphor in Legal Language:  
Clarity or Obscurity?, in LEGAL LANGUAGE AND THE SEARCH FOR CLARITY:  PRACTICE AND TOOLS 
141-74 (Anne Wagner & Sophie Cacciaguidi-Fahy eds., Bern:  Peter Lang 2006); Pasa, supra 
note 13, at 11 ff. 
 133. Cf. A FACTUAL ASSESSMENT OF THE DRAFT COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE 255 
(Luisa Antoniolli & Francesca Fiorentini eds., Munich:  Sellier 2010). 
 134. Freiburger, Case C-237/02, [2004] ECR I-3403. 
 135. On the DCFR, see supra note 88. 
 136. On the issues of good faith and fair dealing in the courts’ assessment on the basis of 
the DCFR and CESL provisions, see Whittaker, supra note 55, at 104 ff. 
 137. The Restatement on the Law of Contracts has become the main target of the full 
harmonization strategy of the European legislature.  At the moment, the codification of all private 
law seems out of the question. 
 138. Cf. Introduction to the DCFR, supra note 88.  In particular, on the definition of good 
faith, see Comments on Book I, Art. 1:103. 
 139. Cf. Whittaker, supra note 55, at 100. 
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parties on the other side, have recently found compromise in the so-
called “result-oriented” approach.140  Mainly developed in interpreting 
recent Directives such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
2005/29/EC, it assumes that national rules which go beyond the scope of 
a Directive are unacceptable, because they would run counter to the 
Directive’s full harmonization strategy.  As the CJEU recently recalled 
“in applying national law, the national court called upon to interpret it is 
required to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the 
purpose of the directive, in order to achieve the result pursued by that 
directive and thereby comply with the third paragraph of Article 288 
TFEU”.141 
 The other approach which gives some room to manoeuvre, or 
margin of appreciation, to national governments, authorities and judges is 
the “basis of liability” approach.  This is an old approach, developed 
from the Product Liability Directive 85/374/EEC, according to which 
Member States could not maintain a more stringent regime of product 
liability than what could be inferred from the wording, purpose and 
structure of the Directive.  Alternative regimes of liability for defective 
products were allowed only if they were based on different types of 
liability, that is not strict, but for example fault-based or contractual 
liability. 
 The point is that both approaches, “basis of liability” and “result-
oriented”, are still possible in their respective areas of development 
(product liability and unfair commercial practices); however, these 
competing approaches are perhaps no longer appropriate for the CJEU, 
since the European Institutions now view EU integration in terms of “full 
harmonization”.142 
                                                 
 140. The two-track concept of full harmonization is traced in Vanessa Mak, Full 
Harmonization in Europe Private Law:  A Two-Track Concept, 20 ERPL 213-36 (2012).  The 
“result oriented” approach is to be found in contract law and has been adopted in recent cases on 
Unfair Commercial Practice, while the “basis of liability” approach has been developed by the 
Court of Justice interpreting the Product Liability Directive in Commission v. France, Case C-
52/2000, [2002] ERC I-3827, and applied to tort law (both are discussed in Mak, supra). 
 141. Case C-428/11, [2012] not yet published:  the preliminary ruling concerns 
interpretation of paragraph 31 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC on Unfair Commercial 
Practices.  It comes from the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) (Civil Division); the dispute 
was between five undertakings specialized in the distribution of mailings together with a number 
of people who had worked for those undertakings and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which is 
responsible for enforcing consumer protection laws, regarding the practices used by the trader. 
 142. See, for example, the recent Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on Payment Services in the Internal Market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 
2013/36/EU and 2009/110/EC and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC (COM 2013/547 final), Art. 
95; or the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Interchange Fees for Card-Based Payment Transactions (COM/2013/550 final), p. 16. 
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 It is clear that a predictable framework for handling the principles 
applied to fill the gaps in European law adjudication would be desirable. 
VII. FINAL REMARKS 
 In recent years, the relationship between national and European 
judges has been frequently described with reference to war or apocalyptic 
metaphors.143  We have analysed two specific areas in order to consider to 
what extent we can share these catastrophic points of view.  Our 
conclusion is that we need fresh contributions to the debate on the 
European system of adjudication. 
 In this Article, we have attempted to examine the function of gap-
filling of the CJEU in the European legal space and the potential 
existence of equity within the European mixed jurisdiction or mixed legal 
system.  We have also looked at the meanings that European equity could 
have, in respect to both Latin and common law meanings.  Analysis of 
the function of gap-filling reveals several similarities between European 
judicial creativity and the Chancellor’s jurisdiction in England, whose 
“concurrent jurisdiction” from the fourteenth century developed 
doctrines and remedies that supplemented the common law jurisdiction, 
and progressively built a more solid and autonomous system of rules.  In 
its attempts to fill gaps, also the CJEU creates its doctrines, formally 
acting under the Treaties, and respecting the legal order where it operates.  
However in reality, the CJEU creates its doctrines according to European 
law but undermines national legal systems, in the same way that the 
Chancellor’s doctrines after James I “followed the law”:  the doctrines 
were not formally in conflict with the common law jurisdiction, but they 
substantially impinged on the application of common law rules. 
 Beside the function of gap-filling developed by the CJEU, national 
courts are also developing a similar function, filling the lacunae left by 
European law within national remedial frameworks.  The relationship 
between European and national levels is conflictual.  If we look at the 
vertical dimension of the interaction, it seems that the CJEU creates its 
doctrines according to European law, but modifies national legal 
systems, as we saw when we looked at judicial interaction or negotiation 
between European and national courts as one of the main features of the 
European legal space as a “mixed jurisdiction” or a “mixed legal 
system”.  At the same time, it is true that European equity in the sense of 
                                                 
 143. See, for example, Arthur Dyevre, Judicial Non-Compliance in a Multi-Level, Non-
Hierarchical Legal Order:  Isolated Incident or Omen of Judicial Armageddon? (2012), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2084639. 
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a jurisdiction pursuing just and fair solutions, encompasses all general 
principles provided for by the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and international instruments, and this can make the 
interaction less conflictual.144 
 Analysis of the function of gap-filling of the CJEU reveals that 
European equity expresses the core principles central to justice 
(aequitas), and is a useful tool for the CJEU in balancing conflicting 
interests; moreover, it can provide a compromise between the policies of 
the European Union and the Member States, whose main actors are the 
citizens, who are both national and European citizens at the same time.  
There is no doubt that the European system can work as a whole only if 
European citizens are aware that they are entitled to enforce their rights 
founded on both European and national law.  Thus, if a European equity 
exists, then we suggest that it should be applied in the interest of 
European citizens.  The telos of the principle of supremacy is that 
national courts are required to give immediate effect to provisions of 
directly effective European law in cases which arise before them, and to 
ignore or to set aside any national law which could impede the 
application of European law.  On the other side, the principle of 
equivalence is aimed at preventing discrimination (European or national) 
based on rights that have been infringed.  Finally, the principle of national 
autonomy permits European citizens to enforce their rights according 
their own national legal rules, which they are likely to be more familiar 
with. 
 Considerable criticism of the CJEU’s activism reflects national 
governments’ concerns regarding the multi-layer system of European 
private law in general, as well as national courts’ resistance against the 
alleged competence of the CJEU to extrapolate common principles of 
private law from more general values, and against following such a 
principle-based method of adjudication because there is no shared 
methodology for distilling principles.145  Another criticism is that a 
common policy on what should be the driving or underlying principles in 
European law is lacking.146  Commentators have noted both the “EU-
                                                 
 144. Cf. Mak, supra note 93, at 338. 
 145. Id.; see also AXEL METZGER, EXTRA LEGEM, INTRA IUS:  ALLGEMEINE 
RECHTSGRUNDSÄTZE IM EUROPÄISCHEN PRIVATRECHT (Mohr Siebeck 2009); Lenaerts & 
Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 55. 
 146. See also Chantal Mak, Constitutional Aspects of a European Civil Code, in TOWARDS 
A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 347 (Arthur S. Hartkamp, Martijn W. Hesselink, Ewoud H. Hondius et 
al. eds., Kluwer, 4th ed. 2011); Martijn W. Hesselink, If You Don’t Like Our Principles We Have 
Others.  On Core Values and Underlying Principles in European Private Law:  A Critical 
Discussion on the New Principles Section in the Draft Common Frame of Reference, in THE 
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friendly approach” of national constitutional and supreme courts147 and 
the recent boycotting decisions of national lower courts.148 
 The prospect of unified opposition by national courts has led the 
CJEU to practise judicial minimalism or self-restraint.  To avoid rupture 
with national courts, the CJEU can find reasons not to apply existing 
precedents to a specific case, or find a way to avoid certain policy issues, 
exactly as it is doing in the two domains analysed in this article.  
Nevertheless, this may not be the most appropriate strategy to guarantee 
predictability and legal certainty to European citizens. 
                                                                                                                  
FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 59-71 (Roger Brownsworth, Hans-W. Micklitz, Leone 
Niglia et al. eds., Hart Publ’g.:  Oxford 2011). 
 147. See, for example, the German Constitutional Court’s Honeywell, BVerfG 6 July 2010, 
2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, para. 58, in Mak, supra note 146, at 340. 
 148. Garben, supra note 103, at 40. 
